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Abstract 
The purpose of this article, and of its earlier companion article,∗∗ is to examine the 
implications of the new European Securities and Markets Authority which was 
established in January 2011. 
 In the wake of the financial crisis, the case for institutional reform and for 
conferring regulatory and supervisory powers on a central EU authority became 
compelling. But any institutional design would have struggled given the necessity for 
compromise. The central difficulty is one of nuance. Where on the spectrum from 
national powers to EU powers, and with respect to regulation and supervision, 
should any new body’s powers be placed if optimum outcomes are to be achieved? 
The question is further complicated by the different dynamics and risks of 
centralising rule-making and of centralising supervision, even if there is 
considerable symbiosis between these activities. 
 This article considers ESMA’s supervisory powers. It argues that, by contrast 
with its rule-making powers, the current and potential extent of ESMA’s supervisory 
powers has pushed ESMA too high up the spectrum towards EU intervention. Local 
supervision of the EU rule-book represents an important safety valve for the EU 
financial market but this safety valve may be obstructed by ESMA’s undue 
standardisation of supervisory practices. ESMA’s extensive direct supervisory 
powers are also troubling given concerns as to their effectiveness. It was always 
going to be a challenge to draw the dividing line between ESMA’s supervisory 
powers and those of national competent authorities. But the line may have been 
drawn too far on the side of operational centralisation. 
Keywords: financial crisis, EU, EU financial markets, European Securities and 
Markets Authority, ESMA, regulation of financial markets, supervision of financial 
markets. 
1. ESMA AND SUPERVISION 
1.1 Introduction 
The January 2011 establishment of the European Securities and Markets Authority 
(ESMA)1 was an epochal moment for EU financial market regulation. ESMA, 
                                                                                                                                               
∗∗  N. Moloney, ‘The European Securities and Markets Authority and Institutional Design for 
the EU Financial Market – A Tale of Two Competences: Part (1) Rule-making’, 12 European 
Business Organization Law Review (2011) p. 41 (Part 1). 
1 Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010, OJ 2010 L 331/84. The 2010 Omnibus Directive sets out the first 
set of delegations to ESMA under pre-existing EU rules: Directive 2010/78/EU, OJ 2010 L 331/120. It is 
to be implemented by 31 December 2011. ESMA’s first official publication took the form of an FAQ 
document: ESMA, Frequently Asked Questions. A Guide to Understanding ESMA (2011). 
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together with the two other European Supervisory Authorities or ‘ESAs’ (the 
European Banking Authority (EBA) and the European Insurance and Occupational 
Pensions Authority (EIOPA)),2 the European Systemic Risk Board (the ESRB, which 
has overall responsibility for monitoring systemic risk.3) and Member State 
competent authorities, forms part of the new European System of Financial 
Supervision (ESFS). The ESAs replace the networked-based and unstable ‘3L3’ 
committees (CESR (in the securities field), CEBS (in the banking field) and CEIOPS 
(insurance and occupational pensions)) which previously advised the Commission on 
delegated rules and engaged in a range of supervisory coordination and convergence 
activities. 
The purpose of this article is to examine ESMA’s likely impact on ‘rules in 
action’ or on the supervision of EU financial markets. The notion of rule-making, 
canvassed in Part 1, is relatively intuitive. But an initial definitional issue arises with 
respect to supervision. The border line between rules and supervisory practices is 
blurring as rules become more focused on outcomes and as operational supervisory 
practices are shaped by process-based rules.4 But as suggested in Part 1, the 
distinction remains valid and useful in the EU context. So what is supervision?5 The 
2009 de Larosière Report suggests that 
the prime objective of supervision is to ensure that the rules applicable to the 
financial sector are adequately implemented, in order to preserve financial 
stability and thereby to ensure confidence in the financial system as a whole and 
sufficient protection for the customers of financial services.6 
But the ‘adequate implementation’ of financial market rules presupposes that optimal 
decisions are made with respect to a host of determinative factors. These include: the 
particular outcomes which rules should pursue and the style of rules (whether rule or 
                                                                                                                                               
On ESMA, see further E. Ferran, ‘Understanding the Shape of the New Institutional 
Architecture of EU Financial Market Supervision’ (2010), available at: <http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
1701147>, and E. Wymeersch, ‘The Reforms of the European Financial Supervisory System – An 
Overview’, 7 European Company and Financial Law Review (2010) p. 240. 
2 Respectively, Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, OJ 2010 L 331/12 and Regulation (EU) No 
1094/2010, OJ 2010 L 331/48. This article focuses on the securities markets. 
3 Regulation (EU) No 1090/2010, OJ 2010 L 331/1. See further K. Alexander and E. Ferran, 
‘Can Soft Law Bodies Be Effective: The Special Case of the European Systemic Risk Board’, 35 
European Law Review (2010) p. 751, and F. Recine and P.G. Teixeira, ‘The New Financial 
Stability Architecture in the EU’ (2009), available at: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1509304>. 
4 E.g., the emerging concern with product governance rules, noted infra. 
5 This discussion is concerned with ex ante supervision rather than with ex post enforcement, 
in part as enforcement is also a function of private action and is not the exclusive domain of the 
supervisor. But the balance between ex ante supervision and ex post enforcement has significant 
implications for the achievement of good supervisory outcomes. 
6 The High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU, Report (2009) (the DLG Report), 
at pp. 38-39. 
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principles-based, process or standard-based, for example.7); the institutional structure 
of supervision; the supervisor’s organisational incentives and internal structures; the 
supervisory style adopted (whether supervision is risk-based, for example.8); the 
intensity of supervision (including the extent to which internal firm processes are 
relied on by the supervisor, or whether the supervisor second-guesses and/or models 
the impact of firm practices); the quality of the information sources available to the 
supervisor; and the allocation of resources.9 Market features (including the 
dominance or otherwise of retail investors) and political factors also determine the 
nature of supervision and the outcomes it achieves. This complexity is reflected in 
the IMF/World Bank Financial Sector Assessment Programme’s characterisation of 
supervision in terms of the authority and tools of the supervisor to monitor and verify 
compliance and to remedy, enforce, take control and restructure;10 this approach 
associates supervision with the supervisor’s overall ‘capacity to act’.11 
The notion of supervision is further stratified in the EU. First, and traditionally, it 
is concerned with the coordination and organisation of supervision across the internal 
financial market, whether through, for example, the allocation of home/host 
supervisory jurisdiction, cooperation and information-sharing obligations, delegation 
structures, voluntary cooperation and coordination devices, colleges of supervisors, 
cross-border resolution and rescue mechanisms, or, ultimately, through the allocation 
of supervision to a central authority. The coordination element has long been a 
feature of EU intervention. The second element, which, for the most part, is new to 
the EU, concerns the operational business of supervision and how the achievement of 
particular outcomes by Member State supervisors and/or pan-EU coordinating 
structures can be supported. Here, the spectrum of potential EU intervention ranges 
from soft guidance on how supervision should be carried out, to EU intervention 
concerning the different elements which shape supervisory decision-making and, 
ultimately, to the transfer of operational supervisory control to a central authority. 
                                                                                                                                               
7 For an early discussion of rule design and its impact on outcomes, see J. Black, ‘Which 
Arrow? Rule Types and Regulatory Policy’, Public Law (1995) p. 94. 
8 E.g., J. Black, ‘The Emergence of Risk-based Regulation and the New Public Risk 
Management in the UK’, Public Law (2005) p. 512, and idem, ‘Risk Based Regulation: Choices, 
Practices and Lessons Being Learned’, in Risk and Regulatory Policy: Improving the Governance 
of Risk (OECD, Paris 2010). 
9 E.g. H. Jackson, ‘An American Perspective on the UK FSA, Politics, Goals, and Regulatory 
Intensity’ (2005), available at: <http//:ssrn.com/abstractid=839284>, idem, ‘Variations in the 
Intensity of Financial Regulation: Preliminary Evidence and Potential Implications’, 24 Yale 
Journal on Regulation (2007) p. 253, and H. Jackson and M. Roe, ‘Public and Private Enforcement 
of Securities Laws: Resource-Based Evidence’, 93 Journal of Financial Economics (2009) p. 207. 
In the EU context, see E. Wymeersch, ‘The Structure of Financial Supervision in Europe: About 
Single Financial Supervisors, Twin Peaks and Multiple Financial Supervisors’, 8 European 
Business Organization Law Review (2007) p. 237. 
10  IMF, Financial Sector Assessment Programmes Handbook (2005), at p. 102. 
11  J. Black, ‘Enrolling Actors in Regulatory Processes: Examples from UK Financial Services 
Regulation’, Public Law (2003) p. 62. 
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The operational aspect of EU supervision is very closely related to coordination in 
that effective coordination presupposes confidence by host supervisors in the quality 
of home supervision, as CESR had long argued in its pre-crisis series of supervisory 
convergence reports.12 
Both forms of supervisory engagement are complex. Well-canvassed difficulties 
arise in the cross-border supervision of financial market actors, the management of 
cross-border risk transmission, and the construction of effective coordination 
systems, as the financial crisis has made clear.13 The questions which operational 
supervision and the achievement of outcomes raise are challenging, as discussed 
below. The difficulties are all the greater in the EU context. 
1.2 The sharpened focus on achieving outcomes through supervision 
While the EU now controls the financial market rule-book, supervision (and 
enforcement) of rules has long been a Member State competence. Since the outset, 
efforts have been made to ensure some degree of supervisory coordination and to 
allocate supervisory jurisdiction.14 But practical convergence on operational 
supervisory practices has been given little attention. The last great reform period, the 
Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP)/Lamfalussy era, was characterised by a concern 
to enhance law-making and to streamline the cumbersome Treaty-based procedures for 
legislating. Supervision was a concern of the Lamfalussy process through ‘level 3,’ 
which addressed coordination and practical supervisory convergence. But despite 
CESR’s initial efforts in this direction, including the important 2004 Himalaya Report 
which considered the supervisory ‘tool box’ that CESR would use to promote 
coordination,15 it would not be until the 2007 Lamfalussy Review.16 that serious 
attention was given to supervision. The Review was not, however, ambitious and 
followed the soft ‘supervisory convergence’ model which CESR had promoted. Peer 
review, mediation, support of delegation, best practice sharing, institutional support of 
cross-border cooperation concerning market abuse (through CESR-Pol) and the 
enforcement of financial reporting (through CESR-Fin) were all features of this 
                                                                                                                                               
12  E.g., CESR, First Progress Report on Supervisory Convergence in the Field of Securities 
Markets for the Financial Services Committee (2005) (CESR/05-202) and CESR, 2006 Report on 
Supervisory Convergence in the Field of Securities Markets (2006) (CESR/06-259b). 
13  From the large financial crisis scholarship, see, on specific coordination mechanisms, D. 
Alford, ‘Supervisory Colleges: The Global Financial Crisis and Improving International Supervisory 
Coordination’ (2010), available at: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1545291>, and, on the underlying 
problems including divergences in national policy preferences, C. Brummer, ‘How International 
Financial Law Works (and How It Doesn’t)’, 99 Georgetown Law Journal (2011) p. 257. 
14  N. Moloney, EC Securities Regulation, 2nd edn. (Oxford, OUP 2008), at pp. 1102-1107. 
15  CESR, Preliminary Progress Report. Which Supervisory Tools for the EU Securities 
Market? An Analytical Paper by CESR (2004) (CESR 04-333f.) (Himalaya Report). 
16  E.g., European Commission, Review of the Lamfalussy Process. Strengthening Supervisory 
Convergence (2007) (COM(2007) 727). 
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voluntary model. Immediately prior to the financial crisis, the EU’s supervisory agenda 
was therefore framed in terms of better coordination and a gradual hardening of the 
soft powers of the 3L3 committee network.17 
The network model which characterised international supervisory coordination 
struggled over the financial crisis.18 It came under much greater strain at EU level 
where, although it was institutionally and legally significantly more sophisticated, it 
was subject to intense pressure from the banking crisis and from poor coordination of 
pan-EU banking group supervision. While severe weaknesses were revealed in the 
EU’s rule-book, the fiscal risks to Member States from poor supervisory 
coordination and operational management of cross-border risk transmission in an 
integrated market were laid bare.19 The importance of effective operational 
supervision, on a micro level as well as with respect to overall systemic risk and 
macro-prudential supervision, was a recurring theme in the seminal February 2009 
DLG Report.20 It highlighted the lack of adequate macro-prudential supervision, 
ineffective early warning systems and the inability of supervisors to take common 
decisions. But, and of more direct relevance for financial market supervision, it also 
noted more micro-operational failures, including problems of competence, failures to 
challenge supervisory practices and a lack of consistent supervisory powers. Similar 
themes emerged in the Commission’s Communication on Driving European 
Recovery,21 the June 2009 European Council endorsement of the establishment of a 
new system of financial supervision.22 and the European Parliament’s 2008 call for 
supervision to be strengthened.23 More recently, CESR’s 2010 ‘mapping exercise’ on 
emergency powers revealed considerable differences between the powers exercisable 
by competent authorities in different Member States.24 
                                                                                                                                               
17  Moloney, supra n. 14, at pp. 1152-1167. 
18  Particularly in terms of the inability of IOSCO and the Basel Committee to respond to the 
crisis: D. Zaring, ‘International Institutional Performance in Crisis’, 10 University of Chicago 
Journal of International Law (2010) p. 475, and P.H. Verdier, ‘International Regulatory Networks 
and Their Limits’, 34 Yale Journal of International Law (2009) p. 113. 
19  See, e.g., N. Moloney, ‘EU Financial Market Regulation after the Financial Crisis: “More 
Europe” or More Risks?’, 47 Common Market Law Review (2010) p. 1317, W. Fonteyne, et al., 
‘Crisis Management and Resolution for a European Banking System’, IMF Working Paper 
WP/10/10 (2010), available at: <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2010/wp1070>, M. 
Dabrowski, ‘The Global Financial Crisis: Lessons for European Integration’ (2009), available at: 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1436432>, and S. Cotterli and E. Gualandri, ‘Financial Crisis and 
Supervision of Cross-Border Groups in the EU’ (2009), available at: <http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
1507750>. 
20  Supra n. 6. 
21  COM(2009) 114. 
22  Brussels European Council Conclusions, 18-19 June 2009. 
23  OJ 2010 C E 9/48. 
24  ESMA/2011/26, reporting that it was unlikely that national competent authorities could 
address a crisis situation on a common or comparable legal basis and accordingly act in a fully 
coordinated manner. 
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Leaving the institutional reforms to one side, the banking area is leading the EU’s 
reform agenda on supervision, particularly with respect to operational crisis 
resolution.25 and the formalisation of the roles of colleges of supervisors and of host 
states of ‘significant branches’ under the Capital Requirements Directive II (CRD 
II).26 But the financial market reform programme is, however, also signalling a much 
closer focus on supervisory coordination and on operational supervision. More 
sophisticated mechanisms have been developed to support cross-border coordination 
under the 2009 UCITS IV Directive, for example.27 A new generation of EU rules 
which sit much closer than previously to the difficult boundary where rules and 
supervision interact is emerging and is likely to have ‘spill-over’ effects for 
supervision. This is particularly the case with respect to product regulation. 
Traditionally eschewed by regulators as generating, inter alia, obsolescence, 
innovation and moral hazard risks, product regulation is experiencing something of a 
renaissance in the EU. In early 2011, for example, the UK FSA produced a major 
assessment of the role of retail product regulation which calls for a much more 
prescriptive approach to product design and for a closer supervisory focus on how 
products are designed.28 While considerably less radical, the MiFID Review.29 has 
suggested that the organisational and risk management requirements which apply to 
MiFID-scope product providers be enhanced and extended to capture the particular 
risks raised by product design.30 While novel in itself, this approach will demand 
greater convergence in how competent authorities approach supervision. The FSA’s 
model, on which the MiFID Review is based, reflects parallel changes to how the 
FSA approaches retail market conduct risk under its Intensive Supervision model;31 
the largest firms can expect a ‘very intensive and intrusive assessment of their 
governance processes and the products that these deliver’.32 If this approach is to be 
                                                                                                                                               
25  E.g., European Commission, Communication on Crisis Resolution (COM(2010) 579), 
setting out the Commission’s agenda for crisis resolution mechanisms, and DG Internal Market and 
Services, Working Document, Technical Details of a Possible EU Framework for Bank Recovery 
and Resolution, January 2011. 
26  Directive 2009/111/EC, OJ 2009 L 302/97. 
27  Directive 2009/65/EC, OJ 2009 L 302/32, Arts. 19 and 20. 
28  FSA, Discussion Paper 11/1, Product Intervention (2011). 
29  European Commission, Public Consultation. Review of the Markets in Financial Instruments 
Directive, December 2010 (MiFID Review). 
30  Ibid., at pp. 68-69. 
31  On Intensive Supervision and the related Supervisory Enhancement Programme, see 
(initially) FSA, The Turner Review. A Regulatory Response to the Global Banking Crisis (2009), at 
pp. 86-91, and FSA, Discussion Paper 09/2, A Regulatory Response to the Global Banking Crisis 
(2009), ch. 11. More recently, see FSA, 2010/2011 Business Plan, at p. 9, FSA, Business Plan 
2011-2012, at p. 27 (prudential supervision) and p. 45 (market supervision), and Speech by FSA 
Chief Executive Sants on ‘Reforming Supervisory Practices: Practical Progress to Date’, Reuters 
Newsmakers Event, 13 December 2010, available at: <http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Com 
munication/Speeches/2010/1213_hs.shtml>. 
32  Supra n. 28, at p. 35. 
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adopted pan-EU and post-MiFID Review, close attention will be required to 
supervisory practices and supervisory resourcing. It is the establishment of ESMA, 
however, which has the most significant implications for supervision (section 2). 
1.3 The implications 
Part 1 suggested that the primary question for EU financial market scholarship with 
respect to law-making concerns the relative efficiency of the EU and its Member States 
as law-maker(s) for the EU financial market. Supervision prompts the same question, 
although difficult issues of task allocation also arise, given the different operational 
supervision, crisis management and supervisory convergence aspects of supervision. 
While a strong case can be made for the EU to act as the primary rule-maker for EU 
financial markets, the intensification of the EU’s influence on supervision and on how 
outcomes are achieved poses a number of challenges. Efficiencies follow from a more 
effective system for supervisory coordination given the prevalence of pan-EU actors 
and heightened possibilities for risk transmission. Competent authorities may benefit 
from importing a set of harmonised operational supervisory practices as rules become 
more complex and the political demands on supervisors, facing a ‘never again’ 
zeitgeist, become more intense. ESMA may prove efficient in discovering optimum 
supervisory practices, and may cut through the pre-ESMA informal network-based 
system which allowed for flexibility, experimentation and learning, but which took 
time. But there are significant challenges. 
The EU’s experience with operational supervision and with related institutional 
reform is limited. CESR is the obvious precedent. While CESR was largely focused 
on ‘rules on the books’, its guidance had implications for operational supervision. 
CESR recommended, for example, that a mixed risk-based and sampling approach 
should be adopted with respect to financial information rules.33 But CESR was 
largely concerned with establishing the reach of EU rules and consensus positions on 
their interpretation and not with how to achieve convergence on the granular 
elements of supervision. Its peer review exercises, for example, mostly aimed at 
assessing formal powers on the books rather than at operational supervision,34 and 
did not yield strong results.35 With respect to coordination, while CESR made efforts 
in the field of mediation, delegation and information sharing, and established 
structures for supporting supervisory coordination in regard to market abuse (CESR-
Pol) and financial information (CESR-Fin),36 its activities were generally limited. As 
a result, the EU has little to draw on in terms of prior experience either with 
                                                                                                                                               
33  CESR, Standard No. 1 on Financial Information, Principle 13 (CESR/03-073). 
34  The market abuse regime exercises (CESR/10-262, CESR/09-1120 and CESR/07-380), e.g., 
focused for the most part on the formal powers which supervisors can exercise, rather than on the 
operational exercise of these powers. 
35  Infra n. 109. 
36  Moloney, supra n. 14, at pp. 1127-1132. 
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centralised models for coordination or with the setting of standards for operational 
supervision. 
Few international templates are available as to how coordination and operational 
convergence can be organised cross-border. International bodies have traditionally 
not overly concerned themselves with operational supervision. ‘Big ticket’ 
coordination issues, including crisis management and the operation of international 
colleges of supervisors, and with respect to systemically important financial 
institutions, have received close attention in the wake of the crisis in a number of 
fora, most notably the Financial Stability Board. But there has been less interest in 
the day-to-day business of financial market supervision and in the implementation of 
standards,37 perhaps as the soft law standards produced by international standard-
setters might be regarded as popular precisely because they allow states and 
regulators to ‘under-enforce’ and so defect from these commitments.38 IOSCO has 
been primarily concerned with cross-border supervisory cooperation and 
coordination (through its multilateral Memorandum of Understanding in particular).39 
While a more operational theme is emerging from IOSCO initiatives,40 particularly 
with respect to emerging markets,41 it has generally not engaged closely with 
operational matters. The Financial Stability Board may play a larger role in the 
development of supervisory best practices, particularly through its evolving role in 
peer review of standard implementation.42 But the array of local and path-dependent 
factors which feed into the achievement of supervisory outcomes make it unlikely 
that sensible templates can be developed internationally. 
ESMA’s adoption of operational standards for Member States’ competent 
authorities and for the exercise of its direct powers raises further difficulties. ESMA 
                                                                                                                                               
37  The Pittsburgh G20 conclusions, e.g., were broadly concerned with regulatory reform: 
Pittsburgh G20 Meeting, Leaders’ Statement on ‘Strengthening the International Financial 
Regulatory System’, available at: <http://www.pittsburghsummit.gov/mediacenter/129639.htm>. 
38  C. Brunner, ‘Why Soft Law Dominates International Finance – And Not Trade’, 13 Journal 
of International Economic Law (2010) p. 623, at p. 636. 
39  E.g., IOSCO, Principles Regarding Cross-border Supervisory Cooperation (2010). See D. 
Langevoort, ‘U.S. Securities Regulation and Global Competition’, 3 Virginia Law & Business 
Review (2008) p. 191, noting the difficulties in moving from standard-setting to enforcement. 
40  Its 2009 review of ‘fit and proper’ standards, e.g., examines the best supervisory practices in 
this area: IOSCO, Fit and Proper Assessment, Best Practice Report (2009). 
41  It has recommended, e.g., that emerging market regulators adopt a risk-based supervisory 
approach: IOSCO, Guidelines to Emerging Market Regulators Regarding Requirements for 
Minimum Entry and Continuous Risk-Based Supervision of Market Intermediaries (2009). 
42  FSB, Framework for Adherence to International Standards (2010). Peer review of the FSB 
executive compensation standards has taken place: FSB, Thematic Review on Compensation. Peer 
Review Report (2010). Peer review reports were also issued in March 2011 on risk disclosures and 
on residential mortgage underwriting. More generally, the FSB has undertaken a peer review 
programme to review actions taken by national authorities to address IMF/World Bank 
recommendations concerning financial regulation and supervision under the Financial Sector 
Assessment Programmes. 
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is likely to develop templates for operational supervision from experience in 
different jurisdictions. But the way in which supervision is delivered reflects a range 
of different factors (from an institutional perspective, these include organisational 
structure, degree of independence, nature of powers, organisational dynamics and 
incentives, and resourcing, for example), which differ across supervisory regimes.43 
The outcomes achieved from the mix may not necessarily be the product of clearly 
observable factors, but can reflect how the supervisor engages with the regulated 
sector and the wider environmental factors which bear on this relationship.44 The UK 
FSA’s Turner Review, for example, attempted to benchmark the FSA’s post-crisis 
supervisory model against international comparators, but concluded that the crisis 
had not identified which supervisory models were best equipped to deal with the 
crisis, given the range of political, market, regulatory, societal and other variables 
which influence supervision.45 It is therefore difficult to ascertain which factors lead 
to strong supervisory outcomes. It is likely to be perilous to export models to 
different jurisdictions and, in particular, to detach different elements from a 
particular supervisory matrix and to apply it on a pan-EU basis. For example, 
supervision is currently delivered across the EU through a wide range of institutional 
structures (consolidated, twin-peak-based and sectorally split structures).46 These are 
exposed to different effectiveness risks (including with respect to organisational 
dynamics and incentives)47 and will engage with supervisory practices in different 
ways.48 
Further difficulties arise. Nimble and imaginative supervision can act as a safety 
valve which releases some of the pressure generated by regulatory homogeneity. 
Financial market regulation is becoming more homogenous, both in the EU and 
internationally. Supervision may therefore become a defence against systemic 
regulatory error, as well as a key instrument of competition between and discipline 
on supervisors. While it has since come under pressure,49 the UK FSA’s ‘Treating 
Customers Fairly’ supervisory model,50 for example, allowed the FSA to calibrate the 
impact of MiFID on the UK’s retail investment product market, which has distinctive 
                                                                                                                                               
43  Supra n. 9. 
44  R. Baldwin and J. Black, ‘Really Responsive Regulation’, 71 Modern Law Review (2008) p. 59. 
45  Supra n. 31, at pp. 89-90. 
46  Ferran, supra n. 1, at pp. 6-9, and Wymeersch, supra n. 9. 
47  E.g., E. Pan, ‘Four Challenges to Financial Regulatory Reform’, 55 Villanova Law Review 
(2009) p. 101. 
48  See further, N. Moloney, ‘Monitoring Regulation: The Difficulties of Achieving “Law in 
Action” and the EU Challenge’, in K. Hopt, G. Ferrarini and E. Wymeersch, eds., Financial 
Regulation and Supervision in the New Financial Architecture (Oxford, OUP, forthcoming 2011). 
49  N. Moloney, ‘Regulating the Retail Markets: Law, Policy and the Financial Crisis’, in G. 
Letsas and C.O. Cinneide, eds., Current Legal Problems 2010 (Oxford, OUP 2010) p. 375. 
50  E.g., J. Black, M. Hopper and C. Band, ‘Making a Success of Principles-Based Regulation’, 
1 Law and Financial Markets Review (2007) p. 191. 
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features.51 Differential supervision may provide a mechanism for injecting some 
flexibility and innovation into the ever-intensifying rule-book as self-regulation 
retreats. Careful and calibrated supervision may also provide some protection against 
firms, in an increasingly standardised regulatory environment, adopting in response 
similar business models which can generate systemic risk; the large-scale 
homogeneity of losses from exposure to securitised debt was a major source of 
systemic risk over the crisis. Although structures are being put in place post-crisis to 
monitor systemic risk, they remain untried, and much will depend on the 
effectiveness of local supervision and on its ability to respond to particular firm 
risks.52 
Experimentation and flexibility are all the more necessary as effective supervision 
is not easy to achieve. The different elements of effective supervision in practice are 
many and complex and reflect local experience and supervisory learning. The FSA’s 
supervisory approach, for example, has changed significantly in the wake of the 
crisis following the adoption of the Intensive Supervision model. Retail markets 
supervision has undergone a related radical change from a predominantly disclosure 
and distribution-based approach to a more intensive and intrusive one which is 
designed to lead to early risk identification and proactive intervention.53 The 
proposed Financial Conduct Authority (previously termed the Consumer Protection 
and Markets Authority and which, with the proposed Prudential Regulatory 
Authority, will shortly replace the FSA) will be charged with undertaking 
comprehensive risk analysis in the retail markets and with following an issues-based 
approach to supervision, in parallel with intensive firm-facing supervision.54 The 
particular elements of this approach are many and sophisticated. The UK FSA’s 
recently unveiled product intervention strategy, for example, highlights early 
identification of conduct risk (conduct risk specialists have been recruited.55), retail 
conduct risk outlook analysis, business model and strategy analysis, and an intensive 
supervisory approach.56 But this new approach, which promises much for the retail 
market and elements of which are appearing in the MiFID Review, reflects long 
difficulties with mis-selling in the UK retail markets, the spill-over of the Intensive 
                                                                                                                                               
51  N. Moloney, How to Protect Investors. Lessons from the EU and the UK (Cambridge, CUP 
2010), ch. 4. 
52  Similarly, R. Romano, ‘Against Financial Regulation Harmonization: A Comment’ (2010), 
available at: <http:/ssrn.com/abstract=1697348>. 
53  Key staging posts include: FSA, Retail Conduct Risk Outlook (2011), and FSA, Business 
Plan 2010/2011. 
54  HM Treasury, A New Approach to Financial Regulation: Building a Stronger System 
(2011), at pp. 69-70. 
55  Speech by FSA Director of Conduct Policy Sheila Nicoll on ‘Product Intervention and EU 
Engagement: Two Key Strands of Our Consumer Protection Strategy,’ Copenhagen, 26 January 
2011, available at: <http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/Speeches/2011/0125_ 
sn.shtml>. 
56  FSA, supra n. 28, at pp. 32-42. 
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Supervision model adopted in response to the prudential risks which the financial 
crisis exposed, and a change in the FSA’s tolerance of the levels of detriment which 
can be sustained in the consumer market. 
The process through which supervisory outcomes are achieved also depends in 
part on the particular supervisory style relied on and these styles – whether, for 
example, outcomes-based, principles-based, risk-based or, most likely, a combi-
nation of all (to identify styles in vogue pre-crisis) – involve different risks, demand 
sophisticated supervisory engagement and change in response to market 
developments. Principles-based regulation, for example, now faces an uncertain 
future.57 
Difficult choices must also be made as to resource allocation. Supervisors 
operating with finite resources, subject to information asymmetries, and in a complex 
regulatory and market environment must, for example, make choices about the extent 
to which they will ‘enrol’ market actors in the supervisory process.58 Prior to the 
financial crisis, considerable weight was given by some supervisory models to 
internal systems-and-controls-based supervision. The FSA’s supervisory model, for 
example, largely focused on ensuring that firms had appropriate systems and 
controls. This model was based on the assumption that primary responsibility for risk 
should lie with senior management of financial institutions and that supervision 
should focus on systems and processes rather than on overall business models.59 In 
the wake of the crisis, however, the FSA moved to its Intensive Supervision model, 
which involves a shift away from relying on internal systems and controls and on 
management judgment and towards challenging business models and modelling, and 
reacting to, potential risks.60 
Where operational standards are harmonised it becomes all the more difficult for 
competent authorities to experiment, learn and adapt. Recent statements in the UK 
are revealing. In 2010, FSA Chief Executive Sants noted that ‘the FSA’s 
effectiveness should thus [given international rule harmonisation] primarily be 
judged on the effectiveness of our supervision and not the quality of the rules’.61 In 
the 2011/2012 FSA Business Plan it was noted that the ESAs had left ‘the FSA and 
its successor bodies primarily acting in a policy-influencing and national supervisory 
role’ and that the FSA had become ‘the supervisory arm of a European rule-making 
                                                                                                                                               
57  On the risks of different styles of regulation, and lessons from the crisis, see J. Black, ‘The 
Rise, Fall and Fate of Principles Based Regulation’ (2010), available at: <http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
1712862>. 
58  Black, supra n. 11. 
59  Turner Review, supra n. 31, at p. 87. 
60  FSA Chief Executive Sants has acknowledged that ‘the historic FSA strategy of focusing on 
high-level systems and controls [and information disclosure to consumers] has not proved 
effective’: Sants, supra n. 31. 
61  Speech by FSA Chief Executive Sants on ‘UK Financial Regulation: After the Crisis,’ 12 
March 2010, available via: <http://www.fsa.gov.uk/Pages/Library/index.shtml>. 
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process’.62 HM Treasury, in a February 2011 policy document on the upcoming 
changes to the institutional structure of supervision, noted that ‘day-to-day 
supervision of financial institutions will remain at the national level, ensuring that 
national governments retain their frontline responsibility to protect national tax 
payers’ interest’.63 These comments underline the emphasis which the FSA and the 
UK government are placing on the ability of national supervisors to deliver outcomes 
for their markets through operational supervisory strategies. But the potential 
influence of ESMA on supervision may limit local operational discretion and 
flexibility considerably in practice, as now seems to be recognised within the FSA.64 
All these difficulties are exacerbated as complex questions of degree arise with 
respect to the institutional shape of EU-led supervision, given the ‘top down’ and 
‘bottom up’ dynamics and the related momentum effects. From a ‘top down’ 
perspective, the financial crisis has exposed the risks which follow where cross-
border actors are not subject to coordinated supervision, coordinated emergency 
action cannot be taken and pan-EU monitoring of risk is limited. But the 
centralisation of emergency powers demands an institutional structure of some sort. 
Considerable momentum risks then arise in relation to the more workaday 
operational powers which can be subsequently granted to, or organically acquired by, 
the new structure. From a bottom-up perspective, greater sharing of best practices 
and stronger peer discipline can strengthen pan-EU financial market supervision. But 
operational supervision of market actors should remain at Member State level 
(section 2.10 below). Designing a system which supports some degree of operational 
centralisation, retains the power of national supervisors and supports greater 
convergence, all the while preventing an undue leakage of power from the Member 
States, was never going to be easy. 
The difficulties are all the greater given the financial stability agenda which has 
driven the new structure. ESMA is a product of an institutional and political concern 
to manage the wider prudential and systemic risks which the financial crisis exposed; 
the final institutional trilogue (Commission/Council/Parliament) negotiations over 
summer 2010, for example, focused on the EBA template. But securities markets 
remain different to banking markets,65 and the financial stability risks which 
currently frame the scholarly and policy debate, while common to all market 
segments, are stronger in the banking markets than in the securities markets. As the 
crisis has made clear, the risks which cross-border banking can generate, including 
with respect to a withdrawal of liquidity from host states and risk transmission across 
                                                                                                                                               
62  FSA, Business Plan 2011/2012, at pp. 9 and 25. 
63  Supra n. 54, para. 7.7. 
64  Ferran has noted the FSA’s concern on this point: supra n. 1, at pp. 44-45. 
65  D. Langevoort, ‘Global Securities Regulation after the Financial Crisis’, 13 Journal of 
International Economic Law (2010) p. 799, ‘slicing’ securities regulation into the components 
which are amenable to international convergence and identifying prudential-related risk regulation 
as an area appropriate for convergence. 
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transnational groups,66 are acute and demand sophisticated management. Securities 
markets can also transmit systemic risk. Different practices, such as proprietary 
dealing, and different structures, such as central clearing counterparties (CCPs), have 
been associated with the financial crisis; so too has the wider failure of securities 
markets to price risk effectively.67 It is also the case that silo-based regulation 
struggles to capture the interconnected and complex nature of risk and that securities 
regulators need to become better at managing systemic risk.68 Nonetheless, certain 
cross-border financial market actors (such as issuers) do not transmit systemic risk 
cross-border to the same degree as systemically important financial institutions. But 
reflecting the spill-over dynamics which are a long-standing feature of EU financial 
markets law, the financial stability agenda will lead to ESMA exercising significant 
operational control over all aspects of the securities markets, including the 
disclosure, transparency and market abuse spheres which have been less to the fore 
over the financial crisis. 
It seems reasonable, accordingly, that ESMA’s supervisory powers should be 
carefully confined and national supervisory discretion protected. But the hesitancy 
which characterises ESMA’s law-making powers is not in evidence with respect to 
its supervisory powers. In terms of coordination, it wields an array of powers of 
increasing intensity which culminate in ESMA’s ability to supplant national 
supervisors. In terms of operational convergence, ESMA’s ability to shape 
supervisory practice is considerable. Ultimately, local supervisory discretion and 
flexibility may be placed under undue pressure to the detriment of effective local 
supervision and pan-EU supervisory learning. ESMA’s extensive direct supervisory 
powers may also lead to sub-optimal outcomes. ESMA’s supervisory powers are 
examined in the following section. 
2. ESMA’S SUPERVISORY POWERS 
2.1 Coordination: in crisis and in normal conditions 
Initiatives to ensure better supervisory coordination in a crisis are a central element 
of the financial stability agenda. ESMA has accordingly been conferred with a range 
of soft coordination and monitoring powers with respect to systemic risk manage-
                                                                                                                                               
66  G. Ferrarini and F. Chiodini, ‘Regulating Multinational Banks in Europe. An Assessment of 
the New Supervisory Framework’ (2010), available at: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1596890>, and K. 
Pistor, ‘Host’s Dilemma: Rethinking EU Banking Regulation in the Light of the Global Financial 
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67  E.g., Turner Review, supra n. 31, at pp. 11-49. 
68  E.g., IOSCO, Managing Systemic Risk. A Role for Securities Regulators (2011), noting the 
traditional focus of securities regulators on market efficiency, fairness and transparency, and their 
reliance on disclosure-based and conduct-based techniques, but calling for a sharper focus on 
systemic risk. 
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ment and cross-border resolution, which are broadly concerned with the development 
of new structures in cooperation with other EU institutions (ESMA Regulation, 
Articles 22-27). Its related responsibilities include monitoring market developments 
and, in coordination with the ESRB, initiating and coordinating assessments of the 
resilience of market participants (Article 32). It has a general coordination role under 
Article 31, which empowers ESMA to promote a coordinated EU response to crisis 
situations by, inter alia, facilitating information exchange, verifying the reliability of 
information and notifying the ESRB of potential emergency situations. In an 
‘emergency’ situation under Article 18(1) (section 2.5 below) ESMA is to facilitate 
actively and, where necessary, coordinate competent authority action in cases of 
adverse developments which may seriously jeopardise the orderly functioning and 
integrity of financial markets or the stability in whole or part of the EU financial 
system. 
Crisis coordination apart, ESMA is to ‘stimulate and facilitate’ the delegation of 
supervisory tasks and responsibilities between competent authorities (Article 28). 
The ‘supervisory culture’ activities engaged in by CESR are also ESMA’s 
responsibility. Under Article 29 it is to play an active role in building a common EU 
supervisory culture and consistent supervisory practices through, for example, 
providing opinions to competent authorities, supporting information exchange and 
establishing training programmes. 
Reflecting current EU policy, and by contrast with CESR, ESMA will also have a 
prominent operational role in colleges of supervisors.69 The 2009 CRD II requires 
that supervisory colleges be established, their roles be clarified and a larger role be 
given to the supervisors of systemically significant branches in colleges,70 while the 
Commission’s 2010 Communication on crisis resolution proposes ‘resolution 
colleges’.71 ESMA is likewise conferred with a range of powers to support supervis-
ory colleges. It is to contribute to promoting and monitoring colleges of supervisors 
and to participate in college activities, including on-site examinations (Article 21(1) 
and (2)). ESMA may establish and manage information systems for colleges, initiate 
EU stress tests and evaluate systemic risk, and oversee the tasks carried out by 
competent authorities. ESMA may also request further deliberation by a college 
where it considers a college decision would lead to an incorrect application of EU 
law or not contribute to convergence in supervisory practices (Article 21(2)). As 
discussed in section 2.5, ESMA has the power to address decisions to supervisors 
where mediation fails (Article 19). The 2010 Omnibus Directive also revises the 
main financial market measures to confer on ESMA a range of powers to support 
supervision by colleges, including direct participation in joint investigations.72 
                                                                                                                                               
69  The ESMA FAQ highlights ESMA’s ‘important role’ in colleges of supervisors (at p. 8). 
70  Directive 2009/111/EC, OJ 2009 L 302/97. 
71  COM(2010) 579. 
72  E.g., Prospectus Directive (Omnibus Directive, Art. 5(10)) and MiFID (Omnibus Directive, 
Art. 6(22)). 
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2.2 Operational convergence and direct supervision 
But it is where ESMA’s powers move beyond coordination and into day-to-day 
operational matters that the real impact on local supervisory powers can be seen and 
where Member State safety valves in the form of operational supervisory discretion 
and decision-making are being closed. Although ESMA forms part of the ESFS, 
which includes the local competent authorities (Article 2) that are responsible for 
day-to-day supervision (recital 9), the extent of ESMA’s powers raises the risk that 
local competent authorities may, in time, become technical functionaries of ESMA. 
ESMA looks set to develop a best practice model for operational supervision. The 
DLG Report, for example, called for competent authorities’ competences and powers 
to be aligned to the ‘most comprehensive system in the EU’,73 the European Council 
called for an upgrading of the quality and ‘consistency’ of national supervision,74 
ECOFIN charged the new Authorities with ensuring that ‘consistent supervisory 
practices’ are applied and with ensuring ‘a common supervisory culture and 
consistent supervisory practices’,75 and the Commission’s original proposal for the 
2010 ESMA Regulation called for it to take an active role in ensuring uniform 
procedures and consistent supervisory practices. On the Parliament’s September 
2010 vote to adopt the new structure, a combined statement from the Chairpersons of 
the 3L3 committees noted their commitment to upgrade the quality and consistency 
of supervision.76 Similarly, Commission President Barroso highlighted that the new 
Authorities would work with national supervisors ‘to improve the day to day 
oversight of individual firms’.77 While an improvement in supervisory practices is a 
laudable aim, the extent of ESMA’s convergence powers (outlined in the following 
sections), combined with its direct supervisory powers, may lead to a loss of 
discretion, flexibility, innovation and experimentation in the supervisory system. 
2.3 Convergence: supervisory practices 
The power to propose binding technical standards (BTSs) gives ESMA considerable 
potential to shape operational decision-making. Hitherto, EU rule-making has not 
closely engaged with process, although elements of process-based harmonisation, 
from a firm-facing perspective, can be seen in MiFID’s best execution regime and in 
the proposed new regime for product governance in the MiFID Review. CESR was 
beginning to promote convergence in supervisory decision-making through, for 
example, its ‘Accepted Market Practices’ regime which governs how supervisors 
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74  European Council, Presidency Conclusions, 18-19 June 2009. 
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decide which practices can be deemed ‘AMPs’ and so exempt from the market abuse 
regime.78 Its efforts to promote convergence with respect to how issuers’ financial 
information is reviewed were similarly concerned with supervisory decision-making 
and the use of risk-based techniques.79 The new generation of BTSs are likely to drill 
much deeper into supervisory practices. Many delegations to BTSs under the 
Omnibus Directive are concerned with supervisory coordination and information 
sharing.80 But many involve local supervisory decision-making. BTSs will be 
produced, for example, on the detailed information which competent authorities 
should require prior to investment firm authorisation and on when supervisors should 
demand a supplementary prospectus under the prospectus regime.81 ESMA’s ability 
to request information from local competent authorities will also strengthen its 
ability to produce operational BTSs by enhancing its local knowledge. Competent 
authorities are subject to extensive obligations to provide information to ESMA 
concerning their practices,82 including with respect to all administrative measures and 
sanctions imposed.83 
ESMA’s specific coordination powers are also likely to influence operational 
decision-making and supervisory practices at national level. MiFID, for example, 
will require that Member States, coordinated by ESMA, are to ensure that 
appropriate measures are in place to enable competent authorities to monitor the 
activities of investment firms to ensure they act honestly, fairly and professionally 
and in a manner that promotes the integrity of the market (Omnibus Directive, 
Article 6(9)). 
There is also some evidence emerging that ESMA may have a more general 
ability to shape supervisory practices with respect to the emerging ‘crisis era’ 
measures. The Short-Selling Proposal requires that ESMA be notified in advance 
where a competent authority plans to impose exceptional disclosure obligations on 
holders of short positions, restrict or prohibit short sales, or restrict credit default 
                                                                                                                                               
78  CESR/04-505. 
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swap (CDS) transactions, in each case in accordance with the proposed new regime. 
ESMA must issue an opinion (publicly disclosed) within 24 hours on whether it 
considers that adverse developments have arisen which constitute a serious threat to 
financial stability or market confidence, whether the measure is proportionate and 
appropriate, and whether its duration is justified (Articles 22 and 23). Where the 
authority proposes to take action contrary to the ESMA opinion (or declines to take 
measures), it must publicly disclose its reasoning for doing so. Article 23 similarly 
requires ESMA to facilitate and coordinate action by local competent authorities 
under the Proposal and to ensure that a ‘consistent approach’ is adopted. ESMA is 
also empowered to conduct enquiries into issues related to short-selling and CDSs 
(Article 28). In addition to its powers of direct intervention (section 2.9 below), 
ESMA is accordingly placed at the centre of highly sensitive decisions by competent 
authorities with respect to short-selling and is likely to have significant influence on 
how the regime develops operationally. 
A similar effect may flow from the proposed 2011 AIFM Directive.84 The highly 
sensitive regime for alternative investment fund leverage includes a direction to 
competent authorities to impose leverage limits where necessary under the terms of 
the Directive (Article 25). ESMA, however, must be notified before the limit is 
imposed and is to perform a facilitation and coordination role in order that a 
consistent approach be adopted by competent authorities. ESMA must also issue 
advice to the competent authority concerning the limits; where this advice is ignored, 
ESMA may make public disclosure to this effect. The Directive also gives ESMA a 
significant role with respect to the supervision of non-EU alternative investment fund 
managers (AIFM). In particular, ESMA must advise on authorisation decisions 
concerning non-EU AIFM and, where a competent authority proposes to authorise 
contrary to ESMA’s advice, this course of action must be publicly disclosed by 
ESMA (Article 35d). 
ESMA’s potential influence on supervisory decision-making can also be seen from 
its insertion into cross-border inspections and investigations. The Short-Selling 
Proposal, for example, requires that ESMA coordinate any investigation or inspection 
with cross-border effects (Article 31), while the Prospectus Directive, following the 
Omnibus Directive reforms, will empower ESMA to participate in on-site inspections 
carried out by two or more competent authorities (Article 5(10)). Similarly, its role in 
colleges of supervisors is likely to increase its influence on supervisory practices. As 
noted above, ESMA is to participate in the activities of colleges of supervisors (ESMA 
Regulation, Article 21). It is also being conferred with more specific powers in colleges 
of supervisors. The OTC Derivatives Proposal.85 gives ESMA a central role in the 
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college of competent authorities responsible for the authorisation of CCPs (Articles 14 
and 15). 
There are multiple avenues therefore which ESMA can follow to influence 
operational supervisory decision-making, with a consequent risk to flexibility and 
innovation and with greater pressure being placed on ESMA’s effectiveness as a 
supervisor. Operational decision-making may be subject to further standardisation as 
a result of the peer review mechanism, outlined in the next section. 
2.4 Convergence: peer review 
Reflecting international trends post crisis and in particular the work of the Financial 
Stability Board,86 ESMA is conferred with peer review powers. Under ESMA 
Regulation Article 30, ESMA is to engage in peer review of competent authorities’ 
activities to further strengthen consistency in supervisory outcomes. ESMA peer 
review is also becoming a feature of EU financial market regulation more generally; 
the proposed 2011 AIFM Directive grants ESMA a specific peer review function 
with respect to how competent authorities supervise non-EU alternative investment 
fund managers (Article 35e). The 2010 Communication on sanctions similarly calls 
on ESMA to include sanctioning powers as a priority area for review.87 
ESMA peer review is concerned with the ‘capacity of supervisors to achieve high 
quality supervisory outcomes’, including with respect to the adequacy of resources 
and governance arrangements, capacity to respond to market developments, degree 
of convergence in the application of EU law and in supervisory practices, and best 
practices (recital 41 and Article 30). Competent authorities are under an obligation to 
‘endeavour to follow’ the outcomes. The results of the peer review may also be 
disclosed publicly, subject to the agreement of the relevant authority. 
A peer review function appears relatively benign, but it may lead to undue 
standardisation. The different supervisory styles, for example, employed by 
supervisors are context dependent. The FSA’s post-crisis Intensive Supervision 
model reflects, variously, relatively long experience with the risk-based ARROW 
model for supervision, the deterrent effect of a potential (now actual) FSA 
restructuring in the wake of the crisis, and long struggles with achieving effective 
‘law in action’ in the retail markets given an array of mis-selling scandals. As 
applied in the retail markets, it reflects a change in the FSA’s tolerance of the amount 
of detriment which consumers can be expected to bear,88 as well as a sharper focus 
on the retail markets generally, with the proposed Financial Conduct Authority being 
designated a ‘consumer champion’.89 Transplantation of this model would be neither 
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desirable nor possible, not least given the different priorities which different 
supervisors attach to different market segments and the different approaches they can 
take to the degree of risk and failure they are prepared to tolerate.90 Similarly, risk-
based supervision.91 is common across Member State supervisors,92 with the FSA93 
and the Dutch prudential regulator.94 being well-known exponents of this model. But 
risk-based supervision requires the supervisor to make sensitive decisions as to the 
level of failure it is prepared to tolerate; ESMA intervention to this effect could be 
troublesome, not least as fiscal risk-bearing remains at national level. 
Similar concerns arise with respect to resourcing. It is clear from recent annual 
reports of the EU’s major supervisors that resources are being increased; the French 
AMF (along with CONSOB.95 and BaFIN.96) is recruiting more and specialised staff,97 
while FSA resources have been significantly increased.98 But it is happening to 
varying extents, in different ways, and reflecting how supervisors, in distinct market 
and political contexts, have reacted to the crisis. The recent increase in the FSA’s 
staffing, for example, is related in part to the demands of its Intensive Supervision 
model.99 Internal organisational dynamics are also key to effective resourcing; the 
FSA’s 2010-2011 Business Plan underlined the need for it to embed the 
organisational and cultural change needed to implement Intensive Supervision and to 
develop a more responsive, decentralised decision-making structure.100 Institutional 
design and the related institutional culture similarly play a very large role in the 
effective deployment of resources; no single model prevails across the EU. Simple 
increases in staff numbers alone will also achieve little where staff are poorly 
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100  FSA, Business Plan 2010-2011, at p. 11. 
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qualified and have few positive incentives.101 The range of difficult issues which 
optimum resourcing generates suggests that peer review in this area will demand 
considerable sensitivity to local supervisory contexts. 
Very large questions also arise as to how the outcomes against which peer review 
takes places are set in an environment characterised by diverging market profiles, 
different national priorities, and potential tensions between competent authorities, the 
ESAs and the ESRB, particularly given the failure to identify any of the governing 
principles of EU financial market law.102 (although ESMA’s list of objectives 
represents an improvement in this regard (ESMA Regulation, Article 1(5))). 
Competent authorities are subject to a range of similar, but subtly varying, 
supervisory mandates which shape outcomes.103 The FSA’s statutory objectives, for 
example, have shaped the UK regulatory environment while broader goals, including 
with respect to redistribution, have influenced the development of the US system.104 
How is peer review best conducted with differing supervisory mandates, given the 
impact different objectives can have on supervisory approaches? Will it, for 
example, be legitimate for competent authorities to prioritise certain market 
segments, reflecting local market conditions, including variations in the strength of 
market discipline? Competing objectives pose difficulties at national level;105 they 
are all the more complex at supranational level. In particular, what if national retail 
market protection objectives were to lead to conflict with pan-EU solvency and 
stability objectives?106 
Internationally, the Financial Action Task Force’s Mutual Evaluation Process, 
with respect to money laundering and terrorism financing, is regarded as successful. 
But it is backed by a sophisticated structure for peer review.107 and takes place in a 
particular political and supervisory context; there are strong incentives not to be 
regarded as weak in addressing money laundering or terrorism financing. And even 
here, the review process has been described as ‘resource intensive and sometimes 
                                                                                                                                               
101  As noted by Jackson and Roe, supra n. 9. 
102  Moloney, supra n. 14, at pp. 1095-1097. 
103  For a summary, see E. Hüpkes, M. Quintyn and M. Taylor, ‘The Accountability of 
Financial Sector Supervisors – Principles and Practice’, 16 European Business Law Review (2005) 
p. 1575, at p. 1585. 
104  Jackson (2005), supra n. 9. 
105  Considerable efforts are being made in the UK to clarify the different strategic objectives, 
operational objectives and regulatory principles which will govern the proposed Prudential 
Regulatory Authority and the Financial Conduct Authority: HM Treasury, supra n. 54, at pp. 45-48 
and 61-66. 
106  Consumer protection and stability conflicts were of particular concern in the US during the 
negotiations on the Dodd-Frank Act 2010 over the (ultimate) location of the Bureau of Consumer 
Financial Protection within the Federal Reserve. E.g., J. Coffee and H. Sale, ‘Redesigning the SEC 
– Does the Treasury Have a Better Idea?’, 95 Virginia Law Review (2009) p. 707. 
107  E.g., FATF, Methodology for Assessing Compliance with the FATF 40 Recommendations 
and the FATF Special Recommendations (2004, updated 2009), and FATF, AML/CFT Evaluations 
and Assessments. Handbook for Countries and Assessors (2009). 
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painful’.108 This is not to argue against peer review, but to suggest that considerable 
care will be needed in how it is implemented if undue standardisation is to be 
avoided. 
2.5 Direct supervision: the ESMA Regulation and directing local 
supervisors 
ESMA’s controversial powers to ‘address decisions’ to competent authorities (in 
effect, overrule them) arise in three situations: where a breach of EU law has 
occurred (Article 17) (ESMA action takes the form of a ‘recommendation’ in this 
case); in ‘emergency situations’ (Article 18); and where disagreements arise between 
supervisors and ESMA action is provided for in the relevant measure (Article 19). 
Article 17 represents a significant enhancement of the weak peer review 
mechanisms previously used by CESR to support compliance.109 It concerns breaches 
of ESMA-scope EU law (including any related delegated rules, and in particular with 
respect to competent authorities’ failures to ensure financial market participant 
compliance). It empowers ESMA to undertake investigations, make recommend-
ations and ultimately address decisions to market actors, subject to strict time limits. 
As interpreted by ESMA, the new procedure ‘is intended to place the national 
competent authority under considerable pressure more quickly’.110 ESMA is first 
empowered to investigate alleged breaches of EU law by a competent authority (on 
its own initiative or following a request by a national authority, the Parliament, 
Commission, Council or its stakeholder group). Not less than two months after 
initiating the investigation, ESMA may issue a ‘recommendation’ to the authority, 
setting out the remedial steps necessary. Where the authority does not comply within 
a month of the recommendation (it should inform ESMA of the steps it is to take 
within ten days of receipt), the Commission (on its own initiative or after notification 
by ESMA) may issue a formal opinion (within three months of the ESMA 
recommendation), taking into account ESMA’s recommendation, requiring the 
authority to take the necessary remedial action. Within ten days of receipt of the 
opinion, the authority must inform the Commission and ESMA of the steps it has 
                                                                                                                                               
108  Speech by FATF President Vlaanderen on ‘The Challenge of Compliance with the FATF 
Standards’, 3 June 2010, available via: <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/0,3417,en_32250379_3223 
6879_1_1_1_1_1,00.html>. 
109  Reviews of the UCITS passporting regime (CESR/09-1034) and CESR’s Standards 
Numbers 1 and 2 on financial information (CESR/09-374, CESR/09-188 and CESR/09-212) were 
disheartening. The UCITS peer review, e.g., revealed low levels of compliance, with only 5 
Member States fully applying the guidelines and 20 Member States not applying at least 1. 
Previous CESR Chairman Wymeersch (in a personal capacity) described the outcomes of the peer 
review as ‘often appalling’: supra n. 1, at p. 248. 
110  ESMA FAQ, at p. 5. 
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taken. Where the authority does not comply with the formal opinion, ESMA may 
address a decision to a financial market participant, as outlined in section 2.6 below. 
Article 18 governs ESMA’s controversial emergency powers. These powers are 
triggered where the Council determines that an ‘emergency situation’111 exists, and 
when exceptional circumstances arise such that coordinated action by national 
authorities is necessary to respond to adverse developments which threaten the 
orderly functioning and integrity of markets or financial market stability. ESMA is 
not, however, granted the wide-ranging powers which this context might suggest. 
Like the Article 17 enforcement power,112 it is confined in that ESMA may only 
adopt individual decisions requiring competent authorities to take the necessary 
action in accordance with ESMA-scope legislation to address the situation by 
ensuring that financial market participants and competent authorities comply with the 
relevant legislation. 
Article 19 empowers ESMA to impose decisions on competent authorities in 
cases of disagreement and represents a considerable step up from CESR’s soft 
mediation powers; ESMA has highlighted the difference between CESR’s mediation 
powers and its new powers to ‘settle sectoral disputes’.113 In the cases specified in the 
Omnibus Directive,114 and where disagreement arises between authorities, ESMA 
may, on its own initiative or at the parties’ request, facilitate a mediation process. 
Where the authorities fail to reach an agreement, ESMA may take a decision 
requiring them to take specific action or to refrain from action.115 This regime is 
constrained: mediation power must be given to ESMA in the relevant delegating 
measure or the competent authorities must request ESMA’s assistance (Article 19); 
particular voting rules apply to ESMA decision-making (Article 44); and the 
decision must be proposed by an independent ESMA panel (Article 41). 
In principle, it is hard to argue against powers which may, finally, deal with the 
long-running problem of poor implementation of EU law (Article 17), allow for 
more coordinated action in a crisis (Article 18) and break through supervisory 
deadlock (Article 19). It is also the case that these powers relate to exceptional 
circumstances, are restricted in their terms and contain interinstitutional oversight 
                                                                                                                                               
111  In consultation with the Commission, the ESRB and, where appropriate, the ESAs, and 
following a request by an ESA, the Commission or the ESRB. 
112  Although this procedure is not tied to a Commission opinion: Ferran, supra n. 1, at p. 52. 
113  ESMA FAQ, at p. 6. 
114  E.g., under the Market Abuse Directive, Art. 19 will apply where requests for information, 
to open an inquiry, or for its officials to take part in on-site inspection by a competent authority are 
refused (Omnibus Directive, Art. 3(6)). Under the Prospectus Directive, it will apply where 
information requests are refused (Omnibus Directive, Art. 5(11)). Art. 19 applies to a range of 
situations under MiFID, including with respect to information and inspection requests and the 
application of precautionary powers (Omnibus Directive, Art. 6(24)). 
115  A discrete voting regime applies to this procedure under Art. 44; Arts. 17 and 18 are subject 
to a simple majority vote. 
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mechanisms.116 While Article 18 seems to grant ESMA extensive powers, ESMA’s 
powers are restricted as noted above and Article 18 forms part of a larger super-
structure which has been put in place post crisis to prevent and contain crisis. Its 
practical significance may be limited. Article 17 provides a solution to the long-
standing problem of non-compliance by significantly strengthening the reputational 
dynamics which characterised CESR’s peer review activities. Article 19 activates in 
the context of inter-authority mediation. Mediation between supervisors will often 
relate to operational questions where there is genuine uncertainty as to the 
interpretation of a rule or standard, or uncertainty as to supervisory jurisdiction. In 
these circumstances, ESMA intervention may be efficient and may also allow 
national competent authorities to achieve practical solutions without reputational 
damage. There are also a number of braking influences which will apply, in addition 
to the formal restrictions placed on these powers. The legal uncertainties are 
considerable, and ESMA may be reluctant to test the robustness of these powers, 
absent powerful cause (section 3.2). ESMA also has strong incentives to maintain 
good relations with its constituent members (section 3.1), which may temper 
overenthusiastic wielding of these powers. Articles 18 and 19 are also subject to the 
Article 38 fiscal safeguards clause (section 2.9). 
Ultimately, despite the prominence they had over the negotiations, these powers 
may not prove, in practice, to be overly troublesome and may prove useful. Much 
depends, however, on ESMA’s competence, which remains problematic as discussed 
in section 3. These powers may also have a chilling effect on the exercise of local 
supervisory discretion, as discussed in the following section. 
2.6 Direct supervision: the ESMA Regulation and supervision of 
market participants 
In a ‘boundary-stepping’117 change to the CESR model, ESMA is empowered to 
address decisions to financial market participants under Articles 17-19, subject to a 
series of conditions. 
Under Article 17, where a competent authority does not comply with the 
Commission’s formal opinion and where timely remedying of the non-compliance is 
necessary to maintain or restore neutral conditions of competition or ensure the 
orderly functioning and integrity of the financial system, ESMA may address a 
decision to a financial market participant, requiring the action necessary to comply 
with its obligations under EU law; the relevant EU measures must, however, be 
directly applicable. This regime allows ESMA to bypass the considerable difficulties 
                                                                                                                                               
116  ESMA’s Art. 17 powers, e.g., reflect the constitutional pre-eminence of the Commission 
with respect to enforcement. Any ESMA action after the initial recommendation to the non-
compliant competent authority is dependent on a Commission ‘formal opinion’ being issued. The 
Art. 18 regime depends, e.g., on the declaration of an emergency by the Council. 
117  Ferran, supra n. 1, at p. 49. 
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raised where a competent authority ignores ESMA decisions addressed to it. 
Although a peer pressure mechanism is available (under Article 17(8), non-
compliance with ESMA decisions or Commission opinions must be reported in 
ESMA’s annual report to the institutions), it is unlikely to be effective in a situation 
where a competent authority is in open defiance of ESMA. Formal enforcement 
powers lie with the Commission under Article 258 TFEU (against the relevant 
Member State), but this cumbersome procedure is ill-equipped to deal with fast-
moving financial markets and related difficulties arising with the application of EU 
law. 
A similar regime applies under Article 18 where a competent authority does not 
comply with an Article 18 ESMA decision. The rule to which the ESMA decision 
relates must be directly applicable, it must be the case that the authority has not 
applied the rule or has applied it in a manner which appears to be a manifest breach, 
and urgent remedying must be necessary for orderly market functioning and integrity 
or financial system stability. Under Article 19, where an authority does not comply 
with an ESMA mediation decision and thereby fails to ensure that a financial market 
participant complies with directly applicable ESMA-scope rules, ESMA may adopt 
an individual decision addressed to a financial market participant, requiring the 
action necessary to comply with its EU law obligations. 
Reflecting these powers, and the legal models established for earlier EU agencies 
with decision-making powers,118 the ESMA Regulation establishes a review system 
to protect third-party interests. Addressees of a decision must be informed of 
ESMA’s intention to adopt a decision and given an opportunity to respond; decisions 
must also be reasoned (and, absent exceptional circumstances, made public), 
addressees must be informed of their legal remedies under the Regulation and 
decisions must be reviewed at appropriate intervals (Article 39). Decisions can be 
appealed (by addressees and by those directly and individually concerned by the 
decision) to the independent ESA Board of Appeal (Article 60)119 and to the Court of 
Justice under Article 263 TEU (Article 61). Subsequent measures, notably the 
proposed 2011 Credit Rating Agency (CRA) Regulation,120 have reinforced third-
party rights with respect to specific ESMA powers. The CRA Regulation requires, 
for example, that ESMA highlight the ability of persons to appeal monetary penalties 
imposed by ESMA and provide hearings prior to taking enforcement action and/or 
imposing monetary penalties. 
                                                                                                                                               
118  D. Geradin and A. Petit, ‘The Development of Agencies at EU and National Levels: Conceptual 
Analysis and Proposals for Reform’ (2004), Jean Monnet Working Paper 01/04, at p. 52. 
119  Appeals do not have suspensive effect, although the Board of Appeal may suspend a 
decision if it considers the circumstances so require. 
120  T7_0478/2010 (proposed 2011 CRA Regulation). References to the proposed 2011 CRA 
Regulation are to this text (political agreement; Parliament first reading, December 2010) rather 
than the Commission Proposal (COM(2010) 289), unless otherwise indicated. 
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These eye-catching direct supervisory powers represent a step change in the 
nature of EU intervention in the financial markets. CESR had taken only very 
tentative steps in the direction of direct supervision of financial market participants, 
most notably perhaps with respect to the agreement between CESR members that 
CESR would approve waivers for MiFID’s equity market transparency 
requirements.121 Internationally, there are few templates; international standard-
setters do, on occasion, speak directly to market participants (the IOSCO Code on 
Rating Agencies, for example, is directed to the industry) but direct market 
intervention sits uneasily within the inter-authority, consensus-based model which 
characterises these bodies.122 
As with ESMA’s powers to address decisions to competent authorities, these 
powers over financial market participants are activated in unusual circumstances and 
are generally concerned with escalating circumstances, whether emergency-driven or 
where relations between competent authorities, and between ESMA and competent 
authorities, have broken down to a very significant degree. Their practical impact 
may also be moderated by the legal certainty risks attendant on these powers, 
ESMA’s need to maintain good relations with competent authorities, and resource 
limitations (section 3 below). The opacity of the powers may also cause difficulties. 
It is not clear, for example, what follows where a competent authority defies an 
ESMA Article 18 or 19 decision or Article 17 recommendation, thereby exposing a 
financial market participant to local enforcement action or retaliation where it 
complies with a related ESMA decision addressed to it.123 The Regulation provides 
that ESMA decisions under Articles 17-19 prevail over previous decisions by 
competent authorities on the same matter, but a financial market participant may be 
placed in an invidious position in the admittedly highly unusual situation where its 
competent authority is in open conflict with ESMA. These uncertainties may, 
however, lead ESMA to be circumspect in using these powers indiscriminately. 
Assuming ESMA’s competence (section 3 below), the greatest risks from the 
Articles 17-19 powers may lie in their potentially chilling effects on market and 
competent authority challenge, and in their related potential to lead to a general 
‘hardening’ of ESMA’s ability to shape supervisory practices. Given the complex 
dynamics which are likely to characterise relationships between ESMA and its 
constituent competent authorities (section 3 below), authorities may have strong 
incentives to support ESMA even if the immediate outcome is a loss of supervisory 
power. Market actors may accordingly find it politic not to challenge ESMA in the 
early formative stages. This is all the more likely given ESMA’s potential to be 
almost omnipresent in major supervisory decisions (should it choose to, and where 
                                                                                                                                               
121  Infra n. 146. 
122  Brummer, supra n. 13, at pp. 281-282. 
123  See also Financial Markets Law Committee, infra n. 191, at pp. 14-15, noting that political 
circumstances may lead to non-compliance by competent authorities with EU law and to competent 
authority action to incentivise the market participant to act in breach of the ESA decision. 
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resource constraints and the need to preserve good relations with national competent 
authorities permit) and the extent to which it will be in receipt of information from 
competent authorities. In the competition field, from which ESMA’s powers over 
markets actors are drawn, the Commission has suggested that its related powers to 
intervene in national proceedings under the European Competition Network, which 
have not been used, have served ‘to impose discipline on the system’.124 
The hardening effect will be all the more intense as ESMA, through a range of 
information-related powers, may become close to individual market actors. Under 
the prospectus regime, for example, it will publish lists of approved prospectuses 
(Omnibus Directive, Article 5(6)), be empowered to inform home competent 
authorities of the need for a supplementary prospectus (Article 17(8)), and be 
notified where a host Member State finds that irregularities have occurred under the 
Prospectus Directive (Article 5(12)). Similarly, under MiFID, ESMA is to maintain a 
register of authorised investment firms which will record withdrawals of 
authorisation and sanctions (Omnibus Directive, Articles 6(1) and (3) and 18); a 
similar ESMA register is also envisaged under the proposed 2011 AIFM Directive 
(Article 5(5)). 
2.7 Direct supervision: the ESMA Regulation and product prohibition 
Specific powers are also conferred on ESMA with respect to the prohibition of 
products and services. Under Article 9(3), ESMA may issue warnings where a 
financial activity poses a serious threat to its Article 1(5) objectives. ESMA may also 
temporarily prohibit or restrict certain financial activities that threaten the orderly 
functioning of financial markets or the stability of the whole or part of the financial 
system in the Union; this power applies to particular cases specified in EU law and 
also, if required, in Article 18 emergency situations (Article 9(5)). 
Although the Article 9(5) prohibition power was originally conceived as a means 
of addressing short-selling (section 2.9 below), the potential for activist ESMA 
intervention is considerable – assuming it is given the requisite powers under the 
relevant legislative measure. The potential in the retail markets, in particular, is 
significant given the persistent difficulties generated by product sales in the EU and 
weaknesses in distribution-related regulation.125 and some enthusiasm, notably from 
the European Parliament which championed the addition of Article 9 (it confers 
general retail market powers on ESMA126) but also from the Commission,127 for 
closer intervention in the retail product markets. But it is doubtful whether ESMA is 
suitably equipped to prohibit products. Product regulation is notoriously complex, 
                                                                                                                                               
124  E.g., House of Commons, Commission Written Evidence, infra n. 158. 
125  Moloney, supra n. 51, ch. 4. 
126  ECON Legislative Report, February 2010 (Giegold Report) (PE.438.409 and A7-0169/ 
2010) and Parliament Partial First Reading, July 2010 (T7-0270/2010). 
127  Infra section 3.2. 
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with considerable difficulties arising with respect to moral hazard and innovation 
risks in particular. The EU product market is highly fragmented, with product design 
typically reflecting long-standing retail market demand patterns in particular 
markets.128 It is difficult to see what efficiencies an ESMA power to prohibit would 
bring, given ESMA’s distance from local retail markets and its inexperience as a 
direct market supervisor. The potential costs are significant in terms of reputational 
damage to the local supervisor, market uncertainty and the ‘chilling’ effect which a 
broadly cast ESMA power to prohibit might generate. Careful coordination with 
EBA and EIOPA would also be required through the Joint Committee of Supervisors 
(section 3.1 below), given that retail market products, as the popularity of unit-linked 
insurance and structured deposits attests, do not sit neatly in particular supervisory 
silos. The risks may be more potential than real, as it is hard to envisage the 
circumstances in which the marketing of a retail product would have the systemic 
implications on which the application of Article 9 is dependent. Nonetheless, the 
Article 9(5) prohibition power may be a hostage to fortune, particularly given recent 
evidence that ESMA may take a keen interest in the retail markets (section 3.1 
below). Recent statements by ESMA’s newly appointed Chairman suggest that 
ESMA would be willing to take action against high-commission products where 
negative outcomes for investors are likely.129 
2.8 Direct supervision: the credit rating agency template 
The Articles 17-19 and 9 powers are default and exceptional powers. But with the 
proposed 2011 CRA Regulation, a direct transfer of more workaday supervisory and 
enforcement competence from the Member States will take place. There are particular 
specificities to rating agencies. They represent a small (if influential) section of the 
financial market, they have extensive cross-border reach (some rating agencies have up 
to 14 supervisors in their colleges.130), the impact of ratings extends beyond territorial 
boundaries and they do not generate material fiscal risks for the Member States, 
making the transfer of supervisory power a less risky proposition. Nonetheless, the 
                                                                                                                                               
128  E.g., BME Consulting, The EU Market for Consumer Long-Term Retail Savings Vehicles. 
Comparative Analysis of Products, Market Structure, Costs, Distribution Systems, and Consumer 
Savings Patterns (2007). 
129  N. Tait, ‘ESMA Watchdog Prepared to Clash with Brussels,’ 2 March 2011, available via: 
<http://FT.com>, and R. Froynovich, ‘ESMA To Be Strongly Independent,’ 2 March 2011 (quoting 
Chairman Maijoor as stating that ‘we need to have an eye, and it needs to improve, on serving the 
interest of the financial consumer and retail investor’), available via: <http://WSJ.com>. Similarly, 
Keynote Address of ESMA Chairman Steven Maijoor, ISDA AGM, 13 April 2011, noting that 
ESMA was ‘conducting work … to form our future policies and procedures in this important area’, 
available via: <http://www.esma.europa.eu>. 
130  European Commission, Impact Assessment for the 2010 Credit Rating Proposal 
(SEC(2010) 678), at p. 9 (noting that Moody’s was expected to have 14 supervisors in its 
supervisory college under the 2009 Regulation). 
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transfer of direct supervisory power over rating agencies is a major development as it 
has required the EU legislative institutions to design an operational model which may 
support extensive transfers of direct power in the future. The proposed regime for 
ESMA’s supervision of trade repositories under the OTC Derivatives Proposal (section 
2.9 below), notably, is modelled on the 2011 Regulation. 
The 2011 Regulation is based on a power-sharing arrangement, with power 
shared between ESMA, the Commission and local competent authorities, although 
budgetary provision has been made to increase ESMA resources.131 First, ESMA will 
have exclusive competence over the registration and supervision of rating agencies 
(Articles 15 and 16) and to charge registration fees (Article 19); ESMA’s central role 
is underlined by the prohibition placed on it from interfering with the content of 
ratings or methodologies (Article 23). Member States’ ‘sectoral competent authori-
ties’ will, however, retain responsibility for the supervision of the use of ratings 
(Article 25a). 
Second, ESMA is dependent on the Commission operationally in certain key 
respects. Its fee-charging powers, for example, will operate within Commission 
parameters (Article 19), and ESMA must adopt technical standards, which are 
subject to Commission oversight, concerning the registration process (Article 21). 
Third, the competent authorities will be ESMA’s operational arms for direct 
supervision. ESMA may, where it is necessary for the proper performance of a 
supervisory task, delegate ‘specific supervisory tasks’ (including investigations and 
on-site inspections) to local competent authorities; local authorities are required to 
accede to ESMA’s requests, although prior consultation must take place between 
ESMA and the authority (Article 30). Delegation may not, however, be of such a 
scale as to dilute ESMA’s authority;132 supervisory responsibilities, including with 
respect to registration decisions, final assessments, and follow-up decisions 
concerning infringements, must not be delegated. Similarly, competent authorities – 
subject to a general cooperation and information exchange obligation (Articles 26 
and 27) – must notify ESMA where they are convinced that breaches of the 
Regulation have been committed in their territory or in another Member State 
(Article 31). ESMA is to take ‘appropriate action’ in response, but is not required to 
follow the authorities’ requests. Competent authorities may also request ESMA to 
examine whether the conditions for withdrawal of registration are met (Article 
20(2)). Similarly, competent authorities notifying ESMA under Article 31 may 
request that ESMA suspend the use of ratings for regulatory purposes in exceptional 
circumstances.133 ESMA is not required to follow these requests; under Article 31, it 
                                                                                                                                               
131  A €2.5 million increase in ESMA’s budget for 2011 was envisaged: ibid., at p. 33. 
132  Delegation is envisaged where a supervisory task requires knowledge and experience 
concerning local conditions which are more easily available at national level (rec. 13). 
133  The infringements must be sufficiently serious and persistent to have a significant impact 
on the protection of investors or the stability of the financial system in the Member State of the 
competent authority in question. 
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must take ‘appropriate measures’ to resolve the issue or inform the authority, setting 
out its reasons, where it considers the request is not justified and Article 20 requires 
that full reasons be provided where the registration is not withdrawn. Some care has 
also been taken to establish ESMA’s pre-eminence in on-site inspections (Article 
23c): local officials must, for example, ‘actively assist’ officials and other persons 
authorised by ESMA, and local enforcement assistance must be made available to 
ESMA where necessary. A detailed regime also applies to the respective roles of 
ESMA and the competent authority in on-site inspections (Article 23c). The role of 
local courts has also been carefully delineated. Where authorisation from a local 
judicial authority is required to, for example, compel telephone and data traffic, the 
national court is to check that the ESMA decision is authentic and that any related 
coercive measures envisaged are not arbitrary or excessive. But while the national 
court may request an explanation from ESMA as to its grounds for suspecting an 
infringement of the Regulation and the seriousness of the infringement, the court 
may not review the necessity of the investigation or require that it be provided with 
information on ESMA’s files. Review of the lawfulness of ESMA’s decision is 
reserved to the Court of Justice (Article 23b). A similar regime applies where 
enforcement assistance in the context of on-site inspection requires judicial 
authorisation (Article 23c). While the supervisory model therefore depends on 
ESMA operating through local supervisors, some care has been taken to protect 
ESMA’s pre-eminence. 
ESMA’s supervisory powers are extensive, including the power to examine and 
take copies of any relevant records or material, ask for oral explanations, summon 
and hear persons, require telephone and data traffic records, and interview persons 
(Article 23b). The European Parliament’s ECON Committee originally conferred 
ESMA with the power to engage in random sampling of ratings to check rating 
quality.134 While during the institutional trilogue negotiations this power was 
downgraded to a power to examine rating agencies’ compliance with their obligation 
to back-test methodologies (Article 22a), it nonetheless points to ESMA’s potential 
for direct supervisory action. ESMA is also empowered to take a range of 
enforcement actions directly, including withdrawal of registration, temporary 
prohibitions on issuing ratings, suspension of the use of ratings for regulatory 
purposes, and issuance of public notices (Article 24). It is also, as discussed in 
section 3 below, conferred with fining powers (Article 36a). Although recital 15e 
avers that the Regulation is not to create a precedent for the imposition of financial 
sanctions by the ESAs on financial market participants in relation to other activities, 
the precedent has been established. In a borrowing from the competition sphere,135 a 
periodic penalty may also be imposed in order to compel an end to an infringement, 
                                                                                                                                               
134  ECON Legislative Report, November 2010 (Gauzès Report) (PE 448.995 and A7/340-
2010). 
135  Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003, OJ 2003 L 1/1. 
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information to be supplied, submission to an investigation, or submission to an on-
site inspection (Article 36b). 
Of particular importance is the Regulation’s delineation of how enforcement 
proceedings will be carried out. The ESMA Regulation does not specify how ESMA 
decisions addressed to market participants are to be enforced in national courts. 
ESMA has legal personality and enjoys ‘the most extensive legal capacity accorded 
to legal persons under national law’ and can be a party to legal proceedings (Article 
5). But limited guidance is given on how enforcement might proceed; notably, the 
European Parliament addition in its July 2010 position on the ESMA Regulation of a 
recital reference to ESMA decisions creating direct legal effects and being invoked 
before national courts.136 was removed. On general principles, the Treaty loyalty 
obligation (Article 4(3) TEU) suggests that national courts should accept ESMA as a 
party to any subsequent enforcement proceedings, although Treaty difficulties may 
arise given that the Commission exercises direct enforcement powers under the 
Treaty as regards breaches of EU law, as the guardian of EU law with respect to the 
Member States.137 There is precedent for EU institutions acting as parties in national 
courts; in a recent UK case,138 the Commission appeared as defendant to an action 
concerning the enforcement of a Commission fine related to the competition 
regime.139 The 2011 CRA Regulation, however, provides that administrative 
sanctioning powers can all be directly exercised by ESMA (for example, relevant 
persons are required to submit to ESMA investigations (Article 23b)), subject to the 
general review and appeal regime which applies under the ESMA Regulation. It also 
specifies that fines and periodic penalties are to be enforceable and that enforcement 
is to be governed by the rules of civil procedure in force in the Member State in the 
territory of which enforcement is carried out, once the authenticity of the ESMA 
decision has been verified by the local authority so designated by the Member State 
(Article 36d). In the case of potential criminal prosecutions, ESMA is to refer 
matters for prosecution to the relevant national authorities where it finds that there 
are serious indications of the possible existence of facts liable to constitute criminal 
offences (Article 23d). 
ESMA’s powers over rating agencies are extensive, but they are confined to a 
small sector of the capital markets. The wider significance of the Regulation lies in 
its establishment of a template for future grants of direct operational power and in the 
relative speed and ease with which the EU institutions were able to design this 
template. 
                                                                                                                                               
136  Supra n. 126, rec. 19. 
137  The Commission’s 2008 report on agencies, e.g., argued that agencies could not be 
entrusted with powers which had been conferred on the Commission by the Treaty: The European 
Agencies – The Way Forward (2008) (COM(2008) 135). 
138  Conex Banninger Limited v. The European Commission [2010] EWHC 1878. 
139  I am grateful to Professor Takis Tridimas for discussions on this point. 
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2.9 Direct supervision: crisis-era measures 
2.9.1 Increasing ESMA’s powers 
Rating agency supervision was always envisaged as a part of ESMA’s supervisory 
competences.140 The extent to which ESMA is being conferred with specific direct 
supervisory powers under the emerging generation of measures is, however, striking. 
The Commission’s September 2010 Short-Selling Proposal, the proposed AIFM 
Directive 2011 and the Commission’s October 2010 Proposal on OTC Derivatives 
all, to different degrees, pull ESMA into the supervisory system, limit local 
competent authorities’ powers, and indirectly increase ESMA’s influence and harden 
the wider supervisory environment. 
Reflecting the Parliament’s addition to the original ESMA Proposal of a power to 
prohibit products and services,141 the Short-Selling Proposal, which responds to 
political and institutional concern regarding the poor coordination of short-selling 
prohibitions in autumn 2008 and May 2010,142 confers a range of direct powers on 
ESMA, albeit subject to an array of conditions and notification requirements.143 It 
will be empowered to impose disclosure obligations on natural or legal persons 
holding net short positions, prohibit or impose conditions on short sales by those 
persons, limit CDS transactions by those persons, and prevent those persons from 
entering into transactions relating to a financial instrument or limit the value of 
transactions that may be entered into; any ESMA decision to this effect prevails over 
any previous decision under the new regime by the competent authority (Article 
24(1)). The change from CESR’s power is stark; CESR was able only to disclose, 
and to a certain extent coordinate, Member State action.144 
Under the proposed 2011 AIFM Directive, ESMA will be empowered to 
determine that fund leverage levels pose a significant risk to the stability and 
integrity of the financial system and to advise competent authorities to take remedial 
action, including with respect to leverage limits (Article 25). In an ‘emergency 
situation’ under ESMA Regulation Article 18, ESMA is also empowered to require 
competent authorities to take nominated measures, including that restrictions are 
                                                                                                                                               
140  E.g., DLG Report, supra n. 6, at p. 53. 
141  Giegold Report, supra n. 126, Amendment 76. 
142  E.g., Short-Selling Proposal, supra n. 82, at p. 5, and European Securities Committee, 
Minutes 21 June 2010, noting the ‘political priority and urgency of the issue’. 
143  ESMA action must address a threat to the functioning, integrity or stability of the market, 
cross-border implications must arise, and the competent authority(ies) must have failed to take 
action (Art. 24(2)). ESMA must also take into account the extent to which the measure will 
significantly address the threat, improve the ability of competent authorities to monitor the threat, 
not create a risk of regulatory arbitrage, and not have detrimental effects on the market, including 
with respect to liquidity and uncertainty. Notification (to competent authorities), consultation (with 
the ESRB and relevant authorities) and review obligations are also imposed (Art. 24(3)-(9)). 
144  CESR, Annual Report 2009, at p. 40. 
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imposed on non-EU alternative investment fund managers in cases of excessive risk 
concentrations. Like the short-selling power, this power is confined: a substantial 
threat to the market must exist, originating from or aggravated by the AIFM, and 
local competent authorities must either have failed to act or have taken ineffective 
measures; and the measures must effectively address the relevant threat, not create a 
risk of regulatory arbitrage and not have a detrimental effect on financial markets, 
including with respect to liquidity (Article 42a). 
The OTC Derivatives Proposal contains significant grants of power to ESMA. 
Under a model similar to the rating agency model, ESMA will register and supervise 
trade repositories (Article 51). It will also play a central role in moving all 
standardised OTC derivatives to CCPs, in line with G20 obligations; once a 
competent authority has authorised a CCP to clear certain contracts, ESMA will be 
empowered to decide whether a CCP clearing obligation should apply to all of those 
contracts in the EU. ESMA will also be empowered (with the ESRB) to decide 
which contracts should potentially be subject to the CCP clearing requirement 
(Article 4).145 While authorisation and supervision responsibilities remain at Member 
State level, ESMA will participate in the colleges of competent authorities which 
will coordinate the authorisation and supervision of CCPs (Article 15). In this 
capacity, it will have the power to request the home Member State to examine a 
CCP’s compliance with the new regime. 
A notable feature of the new generation of measures is the extent to which they 
confer powers on ESMA not only with respect to third-country supervisory 
coordination arrangements but also in regard to the registration and supervision of 
third-country actors. The proposed 2011 CRA Regulation will empower ESMA to 
make endorsement and certification decisions with respect to the use of ratings by 
third-country rating agencies (Articles 4 and 5). Under the Short-Selling Proposal, 
ESMA is to coordinate competent authority agreements with third countries (Short-
Selling Proposal, Article 32). The OTC Derivatives Proposal confers ESMA with the 
power to recognise third-country CCPs, subject to conditions, and to recognise third-
country trade repositories (Articles 23 and 24). 
The MiFID Review has followed this trend. CESR, by voluntary agreement with 
its members, had acquired a role in reviewing the use of pre-trade transparency 
waivers by its members.146 The MiFID Review proposes that this role be formalised. 
Competent authorities would be required to notify ESMA of their intended use of a 
pre-trade transparency waiver, ESMA would be required to publish an opinion on its 
use and, where the authority proposed to use a waiver contrary to an ESMA opinion, 
it would be required to justify its action publicly.147 
                                                                                                                                               
145  The MiFID Review also foresees ESMA’s ability to decide whether a derivative should be 
approved for trading on different categories of organised market: MiFID Review, at p. 13. 
146  CESR Annual Report 2009, at p. 52, and CESR/09-324. 
147  MiFID Review, at p. 23. This represents a significant change from the current position. On 
occasion, CESR has not been able to reach the qualified majority necessary to adopt a common 
position on waivers: CESR/09-324. 
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The speed with which ESMA has become a vehicle for institutional interests, 
particularly the Parliament’s and Commission’s, in centralising supervision is 
remarkable.148 The CESR experience also teaches that the acquisition of supervisory 
powers can be dynamic. CESR did not have formal supervisory powers. Nonetheless, 
towards the end of its era, it had begun to press on the boundaries of its formal 
competences, engaging, for example, in a review of financial disclosures by financial 
institutions,149 taking decisions on the waivers issued with respect to transparency 
requirements under MiFID, and, under a voluntary agreement with leading rating 
agencies, reviewing their compliance with the IOSCO Code.150 It may also be the 
case that ESMA will prove to be a useful device for resolving politically sensitive 
questions as well. ESMA’s role under the proposed AIFM Directive with respect to 
third-country fund managers, for example, facilitated the adoption of the complex 
regime which applies to this controversial question.151 
But ESMA has no experience as an operational supervisor and, as outlined in 
section 1 above, operational supervision is a difficult business. Direct supervision by 
ESMA is all the more difficult given the structural and other constraints under which 
ESMA operates, as discussed in section 3. 
2.9.2 But a fiscal brake in place 
As long as fiscal risk-bearing remains at Member State level, there are significant 
political limits on the extent to which direct operational power can be conferred on 
ESMA. 
The European Parliament’s efforts to confer ESMA with direct supervisory 
powers over systemically significant cross-border actors, including with respect to a 
proposed ESMA ‘Resolution Unit’, foundered over significant ECOFIN concern as 
to the asymmetric nature of fiscal risk-bearing were ESMA to exercise supervisory 
powers of this nature.152 ECOFIN’s July 2010 position accordingly downgraded 
ESMA’s role to a monitoring and coordinating one with respect to systemic risk; this 
model was reflected in the 2010 Regulation (Articles 22-27). Similarly, the 
Commission’s initial suggestion in the ESMA Proposal that ESMA be conferred 
with ‘exclusive supervisory powers’ over entities with EU-wide reach or economic 
                                                                                                                                               
148  The Commission’s FAQ on the proposed 2011 AIFM Directive, e.g., asserted that it ‘makes 
full use of the opportunities afforded by the recent reform of Europe’s supervisory architecture’: 
MEMO/10/572, 11 November 2010. 
149  CESR/09-821 and CESR/10-1183. 
150  E.g., CESR/09-417 (reviewing compliance with the revised 2008 Code). 
151  See further, E. Ferran, ‘The Regulation of Hedge Funds and Private Equity: A Case Study 
in the Development of the EU’s Regulatory Response to the Financial Crisis’ (2011), available at: 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1762119>. 
152  July 2010 Partial Reading, supra n. 126, Arts. 6(1)(fc) and 12a(5) and c. 
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activities with Union-wide reach was removed by ECOFIN in its December 2009 
political agreement, which limited this power to rating agencies.153 
The sensitivity of Member States to bearing the fiscal consequences of ESMA 
action is reflected in Article 38. It provides that where a Member State considers that 
an Article 19 mediation decision ‘impinges on its fiscal responsibilities’, the decision 
is suspended on notification (within two weeks) by the Member State of ESMA and 
the Commission. ESMA is to consider the decision within one month; where it 
maintains the decision, the Council may, by a simple rather than the more usual 
qualified majority, and within two months of ESMA’s review of the decision, decide 
whether the decision is to be maintained and may terminate it. A similar regime 
applies to Article 18 ‘emergency’ decisions, albeit with shorter deadlines. The 
availability of this get-out clause was contested, and the Regulation takes some care 
to underline its exceptional nature.154 Nonetheless, it underlines the political 
restrictions on ESMA’s acquisition of direct power. 
The same concerns are evident in the proposed 2011 CRA Regulation. Rating 
agencies represent a small and discrete section of the financial markets and related 
supervisory decisions are unlikely to generate fiscal risks for the Member States.155 
Nonetheless, a concern to avoid market instability and related fiscal implications can 
be seen in the new regime. Where ESMA decides to suspend a rating, the rating can be 
used for ten days after the ESMA decision; where another rating is not available, a 
three-month period applies and this period may be extended by three months in 
exceptional circumstances related to the potential for market disruption or financial 
instability (Article 24(3)). The Short-Selling Proposal is more problematic. ESMA’s 
role with respect to short-selling is largely limited to last resort powers which apply in 
times of market turbulence. But it is conceivable that ESMA intervention could lead to 
fiscal risks, particularly were it to intervene in the sovereign debt markets, potentially 
reducing liquidity and generating volatility and, accordingly, increasing Member 
States’ cost of borrowing. Some sensitivity to fiscal risk is apparent in the Proposal, 
which requires ESMA to take into account the extent to which its action will not have a 
detrimental effect on the efficiency of markets, including with respect to liquidity 
(Article 24(3)). ECOFIN discussions may further limit the scope of this measure.156 
                                                                                                                                               
153  ECOFIN Meeting, 2 December 2009: 16571/1-09. 
154  Any abuse of Art. 38, in particular in relation to a decision which does not have a 
significant or material fiscal impact, is to be prohibited as incompatible with the internal market 
(Art. 38(5)). Similarly, rec. 50 states that Art. 38 should not be used where the contested decision 
leads to a reduction of income, following the temporary prohibition of products or activities for 
consumer protection purposes. 
155  There has been little sign of institutional or Member State dissent. E.g., COM(2009) 252 
(setting out the Commission blueprint for supervisory reform) and European Council, 18/19 June 
2009, Presidency Conclusions, No. 20. 
156  The UK government is concerned as to the potential for fiscal risks arising from ESMA 
intervention in the sovereign debt markets: e.g., European Scrutiny Committee, 4th Report, Session 
2010-2011, at pp. 14-15. 
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The extent to which fiscal risk-bearing is likely to shape ESMA’s destiny can be 
clearly seen in the OTC Derivatives Proposal. There is some strain in the Proposal; the 
Commission has been careful to confer ESMA with significant influence over CCP 
supervision, including involvement in the related colleges of competent authorities and 
with respect to the proposing of BTSs concerning the application of the new regime. 
Nonetheless, CCP authorisation and supervision will remain at Member State level. 
Trade repositories, however, as data conduits, do not raise fiscal risks and ESMA has 
been conferred with exclusive supervisory powers over these actors. 
Thus far, there is limited Member State appetite for pan-EU resolution or funding 
mechanisms as the current debate on bank resolution suggests.157 Until these are in 
place, there are limited incentives for Member States to place themselves at risk by 
further extending ESMA’s supervisory powers. Its powers are, however, already 
significant and political conditions may change. 
2.10 Squeezing local discretion 
ESMA’s direct supervisory powers are considerable. Certain of these powers, such 
as the ESMA Regulation Article 18 power and the proposed powers under the Short-
Selling Proposal, have the hue of autumn 2008 and are concerned with crisis-driven 
intervention. They may be more radical in their design than in their practical 
ramifications. But they are not to be lightly dismissed. Although the Commission has 
suggested that ESMA’s contested direct decision-making powers over market actors 
will be ‘last resort’ powers,158 as has ESMA,159 it would be unwise to assume they are 
paper tigers. This is all the more so given the alacrity with which the institutions 
have conferred additional supervisory powers on ESMA, even though the 2011 
ESMA FAQ notes that any further grant of direct supervisory powers ‘is likely to 
occur in very limited circumstances where the entity is pan-European and where 
there is a clear added value to EU-level supervision’.160 Even allowing for the fiscal 
check, the auguries concerning ESMA’s likely trajectory are plentiful. During the 
final plenary vote on the ESMA Regulation, the European Parliament noted that the 
ESAs ‘will be able to grow as events’ require. The extensive ESMA Regulation 
review clause also contains some significant hostages to fortune (Article 81). And 
while a case can be made for many of ESMA’s powers, ESMA’s limited experience 
                                                                                                                                               
157  The Commission’s 2010 Communication on Crisis Resolution (supra n. 25) is largely 
concerned with establishing common standards and with national crisis resolution funds, although 
the Commission’s preferred option was for a ‘Single EU Fund’. 
158  E.g., House of Commons, Treasury Select Committee, 16th Report 2008-2009, The 
Committee’s Opinion on Proposals for European Financial Supervision, 2008-2009, Commission 
Written Evidence; ESMA Regulation, recs. 29 and 32. 
159  ESMA FAQ, at p. 9. 
160  Ibid. 
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in operational supervision, combined with flaws in its institutional model (section 3 
below), may generate significant risks. 
The more workaday convergence powers and the indirect effects of ESMA’s 
direct supervisory powers have real potential to lead to undue standardisation given 
the pressure they will place on local operational discretion. Under the ESFS model, 
local competent authorities remain the default supervisors. ESMA’s powers are as 
delineated in the ESMA Regulation and related measures. And, for the moment at 
least, local supervisors are pre-eminent. This division of labour, and the preservation 
of the powers of local authorities, was initially supported by the DLG Report.161 This 
duality also reflects the critical relationship between fiscal risk-bearing and 
supervisory decision-making and accountability, as well as the multiple efficiencies 
which follow from local supervision. It has been important in reassuring local 
competent authorities with respect to the new model.162 As outlined in section 1 
above, local discretion over operational supervision is likely to become a very 
considerable sensitivity given the EU’s control over rule and policy-making more 
generally in the wake of the crisis. But ESMA’s powers and its potential to develop 
dynamically may significantly limit local supervisory discretion in practice with 
attendant risks to the quality of supervision. ESMA’s likely effectiveness as a 
nascent supervisor therefore falls to be considered. 
3. ESMA’S EFFECTIVENESS 
3.1 ESMA’s operating model and incentives 
Institutional design for financial market supervision is a complex process, as the 
construction of the emerging UK regime and the new Dodd-Frank Act structure in 
the US attest. A significant literature charts the forces which shape institutional 
design and the difficult choices which arise concerning the (re-)organisation of 
supervision.163 The difficulties are all the greater in the EU’s internal market with its 
                                                                                                                                               
161  Supra n. 6, at p. 47, describing the new structure as ‘largely decentralised’ and proposing 
that ‘national supervisors, who are closest to the markets and institutions they supervise, would 
continue to carry out day-to-day supervision and preserve the majority of their competences’, and 
that the ESAs would carry out ‘a defined number of tasks that are better performed at EU level’. 
162  E.g., FSA Chairman Turner, Speech at the City of London Corporation’s Annual Reception 
for the City Office, 6 October 2009, available at: <http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communi 
cation/Speeches/2009/1006_at.shtml>. Similarly, Turner Review, supra n. 31, at p. 101, noting 
‘very strong arguments for keeping the primary responsibility for supervision at Member State 
level’. 
163  E.g., Coffee and Sale, supra n. 106; H. Jackson, ‘A Pragmatic Approach to the Phased 
Consolidation of Financial Regulation in the US’ (2009), available at: <http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
1300431>, and E. Ferran, ‘The Break Up of the FSA’ (2010), available at: <http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1690523>. 
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particular political, institutional and constitutional forces which reflect complex 
supranational and intergovernmental dynamics. These forces typically operate 
slowly, gradually shaping institutional structures.164 Although ESMA’s supervisory 
powers suggest a radical break with the past, incrementalism has left a significant 
mark. ESMA’s supervisory powers are exercised through a structure which reflects 
long-standing determinative factors, including Member State and competent 
authority interests, interinstitutional dynamics and (as discussed in section 3.2) 
constitutional restrictions. This structure also reflects the ‘off the shelf.’ model which 
EU agency design provides, as well as the network-based model which CESR 
pioneered. Not all of these influences on ESMA’s operating model are likely to lead 
to good outcomes. 
ESMA is an independent authority. But it is formed from its constituent 
competent authorities and thus continues to reflect CESR’s network-based model. 
The dynamics of the critical relationship between ESMA and the competent 
authorities are likely to be complex. 
On the one hand, ESMA can, inter alia, supplant competent authorities under 
ESMA Regulation Articles 17-19, take action where it deems local action is 
inadequate (for example, under the Short-Selling Proposal and proposed AIFM 
Directive), demand justifications of action from competent authorities (for example, 
as envisaged under the MiFID Review and the Short-Selling Proposal) and shape 
supervisory practices. On the other hand, ESMA’s powers have been carefully 
delineated and its direct operational powers typically activate in crisis or unusual 
conditions and are restricted. From the competent authority perspective, the loss of 
power is real. But authorities may be able to argue for more resources or powers 
under the cover of ESMA demands. ESMA may also inject a greater degree of 
realism into the wider political and policy debate with respect to the limitations of 
supervision in preventing failure.165 The potential deterrent effects of losing power to 
ESMA166 may also drive an enhancement of local supervisory standards. 
More specifically, the impact of ESMA’s operational model is unclear. ESMA’s 
operating and resource model means that it must rely heavily on the support of its 
constituent competent authorities. ESMA’s budget is small. Its 2011 budget is €17 
million and is projected to rise to €24 million by 2013. Its staffing levels are to rise 
from 70 in 2011 to 120 in 2013.167 This limited resourcing is reflected in the 
                                                                                                                                               
164  M. Thatcher and D. Coen, ‘Reshaping European Regulatory Space: An Evolutionary 
Analysis’, 31 Western European Politics (2009) p. 806.  
165  FSA Chief Executive Sants recently highlighted that ‘the [proposed Prudential Regulatory 
Authority] will not be attempting to pursue a “zero failure” regime. Persuading society that this is 
an acceptable goal will be a challenge’: Sants, supra n. 31. 
166  These dynamics have been extensively discussed in the US context. E.g., M. Roe, 
‘Delaware’s Competition’, 117 Harvard Law Review (2003) p. 588. 
167  ESMA FAQ, at p. 13. By contrast, and even allowing for a very different range of 
operational activities, the FSA’s budget for 2010-2011 was £458 million. 
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operating model adopted under the 2011 CRA Regulation which requires ESMA to 
depend heavily on competent authorities. It is also reflected in ESMA’s general 
working model, which is based on standing committees chaired by senior 
representatives of national authorities and composed of national experts and ESMA 
staff.168 This dependence may lead ESMA to adopt a conciliatory and cooperative 
approach as it tests its powers. ESMA’s working model may also dilute the 
competence risks to which it is subject, as long as different national practices are 
carefully filtered. If the FSA example can be relied on more generally, national 
authorities are adopting an ‘open mind’ while remaining careful to protect their 
powers. The FSA has welcomed the ESAs and is ‘strongly committed to their 
success’.169 One senior FSA official has suggested that ‘the less mature approach 
would be to see the ESAs as somehow needlessly encroaching upon our national 
responsibilities’.170 Considerable emphasis has been placed on ensuring that adequate 
resources are committed to managing the FSA’s relationship with the ESAs.171 But 
there is a clear concern to emphasise the importance of the competent authorities – 
‘we believe that the ESAs should be strong, independent organisations and that they 
will best achieve this by working with their members – the national supervisory 
authorities’172 – and nervousness as to the scope of ESMA’s powers.173 Overall, the 
co-dependence of ESMA and its constituent competent authorities may lead to a 
nuanced approach to ESMA’s extensive powers. 
On the other hand, ESMA’s budget may increase over time, particularly given 
likely European Parliament support. During the early 2011 fracas concerning the 
appointment of the first set of ESA chairpersons (outlined in Part 1), the Parliament’s 
ECON Committee chairperson raised with both ECOFIN and the Commission the 
necessity for the ESAs to be ‘always provided with the necessary budgetary and 
                                                                                                                                               
168  ESMA FAQ, at pp. 13 and 15. A March 2011 speech by FSA Director Sheila Nicoll 
underlines the importance of the four relevant ESMA task forces in designing the delegated 
measures to be adopted under the proposed 2011 AIFM Directive: Speech on ‘The Alternative 
Investment Fund Managers Directive – The Road Ahead’, Brussels, 17 March 2011, available at: 
<http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/Speeches/2011/0317_sn.shtml>. 
169  FSA, The European Supervisory Authorities, available at: <http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/ 
About/What/International/european/esas/index.shtml>. 
170  Nicoll, supra n. 55. 
171  FSA, Business Plan 2011/2012, at p. 9, and HM Treasury, supra n. 54, para. 7.9, warning 
that the new UK authorities should ‘put significant time and effort into ensuring that the UK’s 
voice is heard at the European level and that decisions taken by the new authorities are 
appropriate’. 
172  FSA, ibid. Similarly, the FSA has described the ESAs as ‘member-led’ and as 
complementing, not replacing, national authorities: FSA, The FSA’s International Agenda (2010), 
at pp. 5-6. 
173  FSA, Working towards Effective and Confident European Supervisory Authorities. The 
FSA’s Views on Policy Considerations (2010), highlighting the FSA’s preference for non-binding 
mediation and suggesting acute concern with respect to ESMA’s emergency decision-making 
powers: at pp. 8 and 11. 
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human resources in order to fulfil their duties’.174 Decisive use of its supervisory 
powers also might be seen as an effective means for establishing pre-eminence over 
national authorities. ESMA Chairman Maijoor has already signalled some 
determination to address different supervisory approaches, including with respect to 
listing.175 ESMA, despite its lengthy objectives (ESMA Regulation, Article 1), is also 
an institution in search of a defining mission. Professor Langevoort has written 
extensively on the importance of the retail investor protection mandate to the SEC.176 
There are some signs that ESMA, like CESR before it.177 but with more operational 
means at its disposal, may be embracing the retail agenda.178 This may reflect not 
only potentially attractive political support.179 and support from the retail-friendly 
European Parliament, but also a (very) slowly emerging international agenda,180 
which ESMA may wish to lead in order to reinforce its powers concerning 
international engagement and its international position (discussed further below). A 
strong retail focus may, however, lead to a generally more interventionist approach. 
The interinstitutional dynamics are also complex and it remains to be seen 
whether a dependent or antagonistic relationship develops, particularly with the 
Commission (section 3.2); but it does seem clear that ESMA is keen to establish its 
independence.181 Market stakeholders have incentives to cooperate with ESMA, but 
they may face troublesome conflicts at national level (section 2.6 above). The impact 
of international stakeholders also falls to be considered. ESMA is empowered to 
develop contacts and enter into administrative arrangements with supervisory 
authorities, international organisations and administrations of third countries (ESMA 
                                                                                                                                               
174  Letters from ECON Chairperson Bowles to the President-in-Office of the ECOFIN Council 
and to Commissioner Barnier, both of 1 February 2011, The Hungarian President-in-Office 
responded that ‘the Council has put high ambitions in the ESAs …. it now belongs to both 
Institutions [the Council and Parliament] to ensure that these ambitions translate into appropriate 
means each year’: Letter to ECON Chairperson Bowles, 2 February 2011. Documents available via 
the ECON website: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/activities/committees>. 
175  Froynovich, supra n. 129. 
176  E.g., D. Langevoort, ‘Re-reading Cady Roberts: The Ideology and Practice of Insider 
Trading Regulation’, 99 Columbia Law Review (1999) p. 1319. 
177  Moloney, supra n. 51, ch. 8. 
178  Chairman Maijoor is reported to have stressed that ESMA will have a strong consumer 
focus: Tait, supra n. 129. 
179  Although a retail market focus has long been associated with continental supervisors, the 
UK, traditionally associated with a more market-facing style of regulation, has post-crisis focused 
closely on the retail markets and has raised the tolerance level for consumer market failures: HM 
Treasury, supra n. 54. 
180  The retail markets have typically been overlooked at international level. A significant 
change in tone came with the February 2011 Paris G20 Communiqué of Financial Ministers and 
Central Bank Governors, which called on the OECD, the FSB and other relevant international 
organisations to develop common principles on consumer protection: available via: <http://www. 
g20.org/pub_communiques.aspx>, para. 6. 
181  Supra n. 129. 
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Regulation, Article 33).182 ESMA’s influence on the international agenda is likely to 
be greater if it is regarded as a robust supervisor. Article 33 may therefore provide 
ESMA with incentives to increase its operational powers. This is all the more likely if 
international engagement becomes framed, as it was pre-crisis, in terms of 
liberalisation. The SEC’s moves in the direction of a new mutual recognition model 
were based in part on the ‘equivalence’ of supervisory regimes.183 While this project 
has been sidelined, ESMA has some grounds for assuming that an interventionist 
approach to supervision, by a single EU authority, may yield dividends internationally. 
The adoption of a sectoral model for the ESAs reflects political realities given the 
potentially troublesome federalist symbol which an integrated Authority might have 
become. It also reflects practical considerations given the convenient institutional 
template which the 3L3 committees provided and the sectoral split in the wider 
legislative regime. But the sectoral model injects the risk of silo-based organisation 
into ESMA’s supervisory activities. ESMA’s silo-based model must work in tandem 
with, and be cognizant of the impact on supervision of, different institutional 
structures at national level. These include ‘twin peaks’ functional supervisors, 
consolidated supervisors (the dominant model), sectoral supervisors and combination 
models.184 Related difficulties may arise with its governance model. ESMA’s Board 
of Supervisors is composed of one national supervisor from each Member State, 
although an alternate may sit on the Board where the subject matter demands 
different expertise (ESMA Regulation, Article 40(4)). The current restructuring of 
UK supervision, for example, has considered how ESMA representation should be 
organised, given the split of financial market supervision between the proposed 
Prudential Regulatory Authority and the Financial Conduct Authority.185 The likely 
shuffling of senior personnel may make it more difficult for ESMA to establish 
cohesion and trust in its highest decision-making body. This is particularly a risk 
where ESMA representatives are drawn from new national authorities which may be 
                                                                                                                                               
182  These arrangements are not to create legal obligations and are without prejudice to the 
powers of the Member States and EU institutions. 
183  As initially outlined in E. Tafara and R. Peterson, ‘A Blueprint for Cross-Border Access to 
U.S. Investors: A New International Framework’, 48 Harvard Journal of International Law (2007) 
p. 31. Similarly, C. Brummer, ‘Post-American Securities Regulation’, 98 Columbia Law Review 
(2010) p. 327. 
184  The emerging UK model, while broadly based on a twin peaks model, looks set to confer 
prudential supervision over some 18,500 firms on the new Financial Conduct Authority: HM 
Treasury, supra n. 54, at pp. 68-69. 
185  Ibid., paras. 7.11-7.14 and 7.20-7.25. It appears that where a prudential matter is raised by 
ESMA, the (proposed) Prudential Regulatory Authority should be invited as a non-voting observer 
and its views taken into account by the (proposed) Financial Conduct Authority. Similarly, FSA 
Chief Executive Sants has noted that ‘it is vital … that we achieve effective domestic coordination 
and cooperation between the regulatory authorities to ensure the UK’s views are best represented’: 
Speech on ‘Creating the FCA’, BBA Conference, 2 March 2011, available at: <http://www.fsa.gov. 
uk/pages/Library/Communication/Speeces/2011/0302_hs.shtml>. 
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competing for influence at national level and have incentives to take diverging 
positions – whether sympathetic or antagonistic to ESMA. Coordination between 
ESMA, EBA and EIOPA on supervisory matters will also require careful 
management.186 Each ESA will seek to establish its position and turf wars cannot be 
ruled out, although the CESR experience with the ‘3L3’ cooperation initiative is 
reasonably reassuring.187 A coordinating Joint Committee of European Supervisory 
Authorities has been established (Article 54) and the ESAs sit as non-voting 
observers on each other’s Board of Supervisors (Article 40). As noted in Part 1, 
efforts are also already being made to ensure cross-ESA communication of key 
decisions;188 there also seems to be some initial determination to ensure efficient 
coordination.189 Unhelpful institutional tensions may, however, lead to a prejudicial 
‘race to the top’ between the ESAs and, accordingly, increase ESMA’s incentives to 
take a grip over EU markets through its supervisory activities. 
3.2 ESMA’s legal status 
ESMA’s legal status is the subject of some constructive ambiguity. The ESMA 
Regulation describes it as a ‘Union body with legal personality’ (Article 5), but it is 
termed an Authority. Its structure, however, is closely related to that adopted by the 
EU ‘agencies’ which exercise powers delegated from, typically, the Commission.190 
Difficulties with ESMA’s legal status have two consequences in particular for its 
effectiveness as a supervisor. First, doubts as to its constitutional resilience may 
influence how ESMA approaches supervision. Second, ESMA carries many of the 
features associated with EU agencies and the related Meroni doctrine. These features 
and the related implications for legal certainty.191 may hinder ESMA’s effectiveness 
as a supervisor. 
                                                                                                                                               
186  Inter-authority coordination can demand complex coordination models. The emerging 
regime for the proposed Financial Conduct Authority and Prudential Regulatory Authority will 
have a variety of elements, including legal coordination duties, MOUs, governance strategies in 
terms of board representation, and specific coordination mechanisms for specific rule-making and 
supervisory situations: HM Treasury, supra n. 54, at pp. 81-97. 
187  The 2009 CESR Annual Report, e.g., detailed the extensive 3L3 workplan: at pp. 72-80. 
Recent initiatives include a joint 3L3 report on the lessons learned from the financial crisis in the 
context of the Commission’s Green Paper on Audit (CESR/10-1541). 
188  Including under the proposed 2011 CRA Regulation (Art. 21). 
189  The ESMA FAQ notes its role in fostering supervisory convergence by working closely 
with the other ESAs: at p. 3. 
190  E.g., E. Chiti, ‘An Important Part of the EU’s Institutional Machinery: Features, Problems 
and Perspectives of European Agencies’, 46 Common Market Law Review (2009) p. 1395. 
191  The UK House of Commons report on the ESAs was of the view that ‘it is wrong for an 
ESA to be given power to override the decision of a national regulator and to direct individual 
institutions’: supra n. 156, para. 71. The UK’s Financial Law Committee was less trenchant, 
although concerned as to conformity with the Treaty and with the practical implications with 
respect to enforcement and whether the ESAs’ powers would undermine the ability of national 
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3.2.1 ESMA and the Treaty 
The constraint which the Treaty represents may temper ESMA’s exercise of its 
powers. Part 1 considered the doubts as to Article 114 TFEU’s (ex Article 95 EC) 
resilience as a basis for ESMA’s quasi-rule-making powers. These doubts are all the 
greater with respect to operational supervision. The principle that Article 114 does 
not confer power to regulate the internal market, but supports ‘approximating’ 
measures which remove obstacles to free movement or distortions to competition is 
well established.192 Plausible arguments can be made that the construction of the 
internal market requires harmonisation/approximation strategies which contain the 
risks of that market; a fragmented supervisory system contributed to the 
retrenchment which occurred across the internal financial market over the crisis.193 
But ESMA’s ability to exercise direct operational powers places new demands on 
Article 114 as a means for managing the pathology, and not simply the benefits, of 
internal market construction. The ENISA ruling,194 and its support of EU bodies 
being constructed under Article 114 in order to support a ‘process of harmonisation’, 
has been used in support of ESMA’s basis (ESMA Regulation, recital 17). But direct 
operational intervention on the scale which ESMA brings might be better described 
as a different form of intervention, associated with but distinct from harmonisation. 
The ENISA agency, by contrast, is concerned with information sharing and 
cooperation. The complexity of ESMA’s accompanying legal regimes in terms of 
third-party rights’ protection, direct enforcement action, investigations, fiscal 
protection and shared operational powers points to a new form of intervention. The 
ENISA ruling also refers to the adoption of ‘non-binding supporting and framework 
measures’;195 but ESMA’s direct supervisory powers are binding. ESMA also strains 
against the Article 5 TEU subsidiarity principle. Is ESMA, distanced from the 
markets and dependent on good relations with competent authorities, best placed to 
make operational decisions? But subsidiarity concerns generally have tended to 
receive somewhat glancing treatment in the post-crisis legislative agenda,196 leading 
to some concern from the Commission’s Impact Assessment Board.197 
                                                                                                                                               
authorities to discharge their regulatory functions: Financial Markets Law Committee, Issue 152, 
European Financial Supervision: Legal Risks (2010), at pp. 9-10 and 13-16. 
192  E.g. Case C-376 Germany v. European Parliament and Council [2000] ECR I-8419 and 
Case C-66/04 UK v. Parliament and Council [2005] ECR 1-10553. 
193  European Commission, European Financial Integration Report (2009) (SEC(2009) 1702). 
194  Case C-217/04 UK v. Council and Parliament (ENISA – European Network and 
Information Security Agency) [2006] ECR I-3771. 
195  Ibid, para. 44. 
196  E.g., Short-Selling Proposal, supra n. 82, at p. 5, and OTC Derivatives Proposal, supra n. 
85, at pp. 5-6. 
197  Subsidiarity concerns have been a recurring feature of the Board’s assessment of crisis-era 
measures. E.g., the Board’s assessment of the Proposal to Amend the Deposit Guarantee Directive 
(Ref. Ares(2010)16390). 
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The current political and institutional consensus on ESMA’s constitutional 
robustness is holding. This consensus may, as Part 1 argues, fracture as national 
authorities find their rule-making powers and related ability to build their 
institutional position and reputational capital constrained by ESMA. ESMA’s new 
supervisory powers may place even greater strain on this consensus as rule-making 
power has been draining from the Member States to the EU for some time. 
Competent authorities are also focusing more closely on supervision. The French 
AMF’s 2008 policy on Better Regulation highlights the AMF’s new focus on risk 
evaluation methodologies, new surveillance tools, more specialised personnel and an 
internal management reorganisation.198 The 2008 Annual Report by the Italian 
CONSOB highlights its launching of a strategic planning process to define 
supervisory policies.199 The Dutch AFM’s efforts include a heightened focus on 
audits and a 2010 report calling for a fundamental change to how audits were 
conducted.200 In the UK, operational supervision has become a major preoccupation 
following the Supervisory Enhancement Programme over 2008-2009 and the related 
adoption of Intensive Supervision. ESMA’s supervisory activities may become an 
unwelcome check on supervisory innovation. Supervision is also likely to be an area 
of considerable sensitivity as it represents the only significant lever which local 
competent authorities may pull to protect their markets. 
ESMA may therefore be sensitive to the potential for a competence challenge and 
of the related need to manage carefully relationships with national authorities as it 
tests its supervisory powers. The risk of constitutional challenge may accordingly 
brake ESMA. 
3.2.2 ESMA as an agency and the Meroni effect 
The seminal Meroni ruling.201 provides that discretionary powers involving a wide 
margin of discretion which may make possible the execution of economic policy 
cannot be delegated by an EU institution. Only clearly defined executive powers, 
subject to strict review in light of objective criteria determined by the delegating 
authority, may be delegated. The Meroni ruling is strongly associated with the 
proliferation of agencies over the last twenty years or so and has shaped the structure 
and powers of EU agencies.202 It has also shaped ESMA in that many of ESMA’s 
features are designed to respond to the Meroni constraint.203 But two difficulties in 
                                                                                                                                               
198  AMF, Better Regulation: Initial Assessment and 2008/2009 Work Agenda (2008), at p. 16. 
199  CONSOB, Annual Report 2008, at pp. 15-16. 
200  AFM, Report on General Findings Regarding Audit Quality and Quality Control 
Monitoring (2010). 
201  Case 9/56 Meroni v. High Authority [1957-1958] ECR 133. 
202  E.g., D. Curtin, ‘Holding (Quasi-)Autonomous EU Administrative Actors to Public Account’, 
13 European Law Journal (2007) p. 523, and Geradin and Petit, supra n. 118, at pp. 42-43. 
203  See Part 1 with respect to rule-making. 
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particular arise. First, it is not clear that the agency/Meroni model is an appropriate 
design for a nascent financial market supervisor. Second, the agency/Meroni model 
may generate legal certainty risks which prejudice effective supervision. 
Turning to the first difficulty, a significant EU administrative law literature 
examines the impact of Meroni on agency design and the different measures 
employed to bolster agency legitimacy and accountability in a delegation context.204 
But there are particular difficulties in using the Meroni/delegation model, however 
sophisticated (and Treaty-driven), as the blueprint for a nascent supervisor. Many 
Meroni-related agency features are concerned with protecting the Commission’s 
position as principal with respect to the delegation of executive tasks.205 But the 
Commission’s traditional role in the financial markets area has been to initiate 
policy, propose legislation and adopt delegated rules. It has little experience with the 
operational business of supervision. It is also not clear that the Commission is the 
principal whose interests need to be protected.206 There is a Commission interest in 
managing the delegation of executive/implementing powers. But the co-legislators 
(the Parliament and Council) also have an interest given the norm-setting quality of 
supervision and enforcement decisions. And although ESMA’s supervisory powers 
are not formally delegated from the Member States (they are not EU institutions 
from which powers can be delegated), the Member State interest is considerable. 
Although some EU agencies are conferred with new supervisory powers, supervisory 
powers in the financial market sphere lay (and still lie) with the Member States,207 
before their being conferred on ESMA. The concepts of institutional delegation and 
control which have dominated EU agency design do not therefore have the same 
traction with respect to ESMA and may lead to operational inefficiencies. 
The proposed 2011 CRA Regulation places tight restrictions, for example, on 
how ESMA is to impose monetary penalties (discussed below). It represents an 
improvement on the original Proposal according to which fining power was reserved 
to the Commission under a Meroni-based model.208 which was potentially cumber-
                                                                                                                                               
204  E.g., M. Busuioc, ‘Accountability, Control and Independence: The Case of European 
Agencies’, 15 European Law Journal (2009) p. 599, and R. Dehousse, ‘Misfits: EU Law and the 
Transformation of European Governance’, Jean Monnet Working Paper 2/02 (2002), at p. 13. 
205  D. Curtin, ‘Delegation to EU Non-Majoritarian Agencies and Emerging Practices of Public 
Accountability’, in D. Geradin, R. Muňoz and N. Petit, eds., Regulation through Agencies in the 
EU. A New Paradigm of European Governance? (Cheltenham, Elgar 2005) p. 87, at pp. 93-95. 
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207  Ibid., at p. 94, in the context of the enforcement powers exercised by the (then) proposed 
Community Fisheries Control Agency and, similarly, Dehousse supra n. 204, at p. 13, suggesting 
that implementation powers move from Member States to agencies, and Geradin and Petit, supra n. 
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208  European Commission, Improving EU Supervision of Credit Rating Agencies – Frequently 
Asked Questions (2009) (MEMO/10/230). The Commission’s Impact Assessment also argued 
against direct ESMA fining power given Meroni concerns: supra n. 130, at p. 30. 
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some, inefficient and likely to exacerbate tensions between the Commission and 
ESMA. But the current detailed model is also troublesome. It limits ESMA’s 
discretion and assumes (given the level of detail in the Regulation) that the co-
legislators (Parliament and Council) are better placed to deal with granular 
operational matters than ESMA. Given the third-party protections provided under the 
ESMA Regulation (section 2.6 above), there seems little reason to restrict ESMA’s 
operational discretion, apart from the apparent constitutional restrictions, institutional 
deference to Meroni and related earlier agency precedents; the fining regime under 
the European Aviation Safety Agency Regulation, for example, reserves fining 
powers to the Commission.209 The Commission’s related influence over ESMA’s 
rating agency powers (section 2.8 above) is more generally troublesome. Relations 
between the Commission and ESMA are likely to be tense, given that, as argued in 
Part 1, the Commission stands to lose from ESMA’s acquisition of power. But the 
formalisation of Commission oversight over ESMA’s supervisory powers, reflecting 
the Meroni model, means that tensions may be fed through to operational decision-
making. These tensions may be increased by the European Parliament’s championing 
of ESMA as a supervisor.210 Unlike the Commission, the Parliament has little to fear 
from ESMA, particularly given the Parliament’s status as a co-legislator with 
ECOFIN with respect to the legislative measures which confer power on ESMA. 
Also unlike the Commission, constitutionally the Parliament is not directly 
concerned with implementation. The recent evidence concerning product prohibition 
is revealing. Under the MiFID Review, the Commission has proposed that it be 
empowered to ban products in defined circumstances.211 The ESMA Regulation, 
however, contains an enabling clause which empowers ESMA temporarily to 
prohibit products (section 2.7 above). While the chances of such a Commission 
power surviving the legislative process are low given the institutional sensitivities 
and likely Member State hostility, its very articulation by the Commission suggests 
its concern to limit the transfer of supervisory powers to ESMA. 
Second, once the decision was taken to base ESMA’s design on agency/Meroni 
lines, legal certainty risks increased. Under Meroni, discretionary decisions which 
‘require difficult choices in reconciling various objectives laid down in the Treaty 
                                                                                                                                               
209  Regulation (EC) No 216/2008, OJ 2008 L79/1, Art. 25. 
210  E.g., the Parliament and/or its ECON Committee: added Art. 9 to the ESMA Regulation and 
called for direct supervisory powers over systemically significant actors (supra n. 126); added the 
ESMA power to undertake random sample tests on the validity of ratings, later diluted to a power 
to oversee back-testing by rating agencies, to the proposed 2011 CRA Regulation (Gauzès Report, 
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Authority’, European Voice, 25 November 2011, available via: <http://www.europeanvoice.com>); 
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ECON Legislative Report, November 2010 (Canfin Report) (PE.454.372). 
211  MiFID Review, at pp. 80-81. 
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amounting to the execution of actual economic policy’ cannot be delegated. Most EU 
agencies do not cause difficulties in this regard as they are designed to support 
cooperation between national authorities, collate information or provide 
administrative support or technical expertise to the Commission.212 A handful of EU 
agencies at the top of the agency ‘hierarchy’ are ‘decision-making’ authorities in that 
they can impose decisions on third parties. But even these advanced agencies 
exercise more limited decision-making powers and typically operate within discrete 
and specialist EU regimes, usually concerned with licensing. The Community Plant 
Variety Office (CVPO) exercises licensing and right conferral powers.213 The Office 
for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (OHIM) administers the Community trade 
mark regime and exercises related trademark conferral powers.214 The European 
Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) exercises powers with respect to safety licensing 
under the aviation regime.215 The European Chemicals Agency registers, evaluates 
and authorises chemicals under the EU’s ‘REACH’ regime.216 All of these decision-
making powers are limited and closely related to particular EU regimes.217 A step 
change occurred in 2009 with the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy 
Regulators,218 which can take ‘individual regulatory decisions’ with potentially 
discretionary and economic implications with respect to cross-border energy 
infrastructures and exemptions from the energy regime.219 
ESMA, however, is particularly vulnerable to challenge for breach of the 
prohibition on delegation of discretionary powers. The sensitive nature of the 
economic interests potentially at stake is reflected in the Article 38 fiscal safeguard 
clause as well as in the restrictions which apply to ESMA’s direct powers generally. 
Supervisory decisions can also have a norm-setting effect in financial market 
regulation; the FSA’s ‘Treating Customers Fairly’ supervisory model came to be 
regarded as a form of quasi-rule-making by the FSA.220 It is also not clear that these 
powers are clearly defined. Challenges may follow given the vagueness of the typical 
governing terms: when might ESMA safely assume that competition has been 
distorted, the orderly functioning of the market affected or market stability 
threatened? The Meroni constraint may therefore lead to a situation in which 
ESMA’s powers are unstable and legal certainty is threatened; the FSA’s 2010 
position paper on the ESAs is alive to this risk, suggesting that ESMA take care to 
ensure that any emergency action is not ultra vires.221 The Meroni constraint may 
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also lead to the risk of ESMA not exercising powers in cases where it should, fearful 
of triggering litigation. 
The legal certainty risk may diminish in the future as the institutions become 
more familiar with how to design ESMA powers within the Meroni restriction. The 
proposed 2011 CRA Regulation, for example, generated some considerable 
sensitivity to Meroni requirements on the part of certain Member States.222 as well as 
the Commission,223 and evolved significantly over the negotiations; the December 
2011 political agreement is considerably more sophisticated than the Commission’s 
original Proposal. ESMA’s operational discretion is confined by, for example, 
deadline controls on the registration process (Articles 15-18), the Commission’s 
setting of registration and supervisory fees (Article 19),224 and requirements 
governing ESMA’s powers to request information (Article 23a), to carry out general 
investigations (Article 23b) and to take part in or require on-site inspections (Article 
23c). Particular requirements apply to ESMA’s supervision of back-testing by rating 
agencies of their methodologies (Article 22a). A detailed Annex III sets out the 
circumstances in which ESMA can take enforcement action. The nature of 
enforcement action, including how the seriousness of an infringement is assessed, is 
specified in detail under Articles 24 and 36a and b. Procedural requirements apply, 
including the requirement for an independent investigation officer within ESMA to 
investigate the breach (Article 23d). The fining regime is particularly sensitive to 
Meroni. The power to impose fines (Article 36a) arises only where the Board of 
Supervisors finds that a rating agency has, negligently or intentionally (as defined in 
the Regulation), committed an infringement identified in Annex III. A minimum and 
maximum fine range applies to each of the Annex III infringements. The Regulation 
also sets out how ESMA should decide whether fines ‘should be at the lower, the 
middle or the higher’ end of these limits.225 This highly detailed regime will be 
supported by delegated rules adopted by the Commission with respect to, for 
example, defence rights, temporal requirements, limitation periods and the collection 
of fines. A similar design applies to periodic penalties under Article 36b. 
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But the price of Meroni compliance may be inefficiencies given the limitations on 
ESMA’s freedom to act. Difficulties also remain. ESMA’s supervisory powers under 
the 2011 CRA Regulation are less heavily constrained than its enforcement powers. 
Notably, the Commission’s Impact Assessment Board was not convinced with the 
explanation of how the supervisory regime met the Meroni doctrine, and requested a 
new Impact Assessment.226 Its review of the revised Impact Assessment repeated this 
concern.227 
The Meroni constraint may have led to a ‘worst of both worlds’ scenario. There 
are risks to ESMA’s supervisory powers. But once ESMA became the institutional 
vehicle for pan-EU supervision, certainty and effectiveness were required. The 
Meroni/agency model, however, is ill-suited to financial market supervision. 
4. CONCLUSION 
The extent of ESMA’s supervisory powers may have pushed ESMA too high up the 
spectrum from national and towards EU powers, particularly given the likely 
momentum effects. The ESFS is based on operational supervision remaining at 
Member State level; the danger of this becoming a matter of form rather than 
substance is considerable. There are also significant uncertainties as to ESMA’s 
effectiveness as a direct supervisor, which, combined with the current institutional 
enthusiasm for conferring additional powers on ESMA, is troubling. The Meroni 
constraint, combined with other structural features, may also lead to less than 
optimum supervisory decisions by ESMA. 
The braver option might have been to limit ESMA’s influence on supervision. It 
might, for example, have been possible to distinguish between ESMA and EBA, 
which currently share the same set of powers, and to limit ESMA’s direct 
supervisory powers, given that the financial stability concerns which have driven the 
new structure are, in some respects at least, weaker in the financial market context. 
But once supervision was placed on the reform agenda, a Pandora’s Box opened. It 
was always going to be a challenge to draw the dividing line between ESMA’s 
powers and those of national competent authorities. Time will tell, but the line may 
have been drawn too far on the side of further operational centralisation. 
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